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 ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECT OF VICTIM STATUS AND SYSTEM THREAT  
ON RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE 
Kristine M. Chapleau, M.S. 
Marquette University, 2010 
 This study examined how rape myths are used to protect the perpetrator, 
particularly high-status perpetrators.  Participants read a date-rape scenario: the status of 
the victim and perpetrator were manipulated as well as the threat the victim posed to the 
perpetrator as depicted by whom the victim would tell about the rape.  Participants with a 
strong system justification orientation reported lower rape myth acceptance when a low-
status victim decided to tell no one about a high-status perpetrator raping her compared to 
when she decided to report him to the police.  This suggests that rape myth acceptance is 
malleable and that the absence of rape myth acceptance may be the reward for low-status 
victims who do not threaten the status quo.   
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Dominant-group members maintain their authority and higher status through the 
use of violence against subordinate-group members (Jackman, 2001).  Because this 
violence could incite the subordinate group to revolt, this violence is obfuscated to 
maintain the legitimacy of the dominant group’s higher status.  Indeed, dominant-group 
members are sensitive to threats against their authority made by the subordinate group 
(Jackman, 2001; Glick & Fiske, 2001; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).  To 
protect the dominant group’s authority and maintain group inequality, the dominant 
group may vilify subordinates who seek justice (Jackman, 2001) as well as create 
ideologies that explain social inequality as fair and natural (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & 
Hunyady, 2002; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, Ni Sullivan, 2003). 
From this perspective, rape has been conceptualized as a tool to keep women in 
their place either through physical force or threat of physical force (Burt, 1980; Groth & 
Burgess, 1978).  When rape victims demand justice, they are often vilified for unjustly 
accusing someone (e.g., a dominant-group member) of rape (Benedict, 1992).  Some 
people may even perceive the victim’s rape allegation as a hostile attack on the 
perpetrator (Katz, 2004).  For example, Yamawaki, Darby, and Queiroz (2007) found that 
when the female victim was lower status (i.e., less educated, less successful) than was the 
male assailant, participants blamed the victim more and they expressed more hostile 
sexist attitudes toward women.  This finding suggests that violence committed by a 
dominant-group member against a subordinate-group member may be perceived as a 
threat to the status quo.   
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Consistent with the idea that people create ideologies to explain social inequality 
as fair and natural (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Jost, Pelham et al., 
2003), a number of social scientists propose that rape myths have been created to explain 
sexual violence as fair and natural (Burt & Albin, 1981; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994).  
Rape myths are false beliefs about rape that absolve the perpetrator for his misdeeds (e.g., 
“Men don’t usually intend to force sex on a woman, but sometimes they get too sexually 
carried away.”), disregard the harm he inflicted on the victim (e.g., “Being raped isn’t as 
bad as being mugged and beaten.”), and blame the victim for the assault (e.g., “If a 
woman is raped while she is drunk, she is at least somewhat responsible for letting things 
get out of control.”; Payne, Lonsway, & Fitzgerald, 1999).  Third parties (e.g., judges, 
police, family members, etc.) who endorse rape myths are less sympathetic toward rape 
victims and are less likely to blame or prosecute the perpetrator (Burt, 1980; Campbell & 
Johnson, 1997; Du Mont, Miller, & Myhr, 2003; Feild, 1978; Frohmann, 1991; George & 
Martinez, 2002; Koss, 2000; see Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994 for a review).   
 For this reason, it is important to understand what factors will increase people’s 
rape myth acceptance.  Previous research, however, has studied the relationship between 
rape myth acceptance and other factors (e.g., sexism) or how rape myth acceptance 
predicts victim blame.  For example, higher rape myth acceptance is associated with 
being male (Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1995), having authoritarian personality traits 
(Altermeyer, 1998; Lerner & Miller, 1978; Mirels & Garrett, 1971; Sidanius, Levin, 
Federico, & Pratto, 2001), and upholding traditional gender roles (Burt, 1980; Chapleau, 
Oswald, & Russell, 2007; Glick & Fiske, 1997).  Furthermore, rape myth acceptance 
predicts victim blame when the victim is lower status than the perpetrator (Yamawaki et 
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al., 2007) and when the victim is romantically involved with the perpetrator (Frese, 
Moya, & Megias, 2004).  Researchers have not examined if or how rape myths are 
employed to protect the perpetrator and thus, the status quo.  Specifically, how do the 
victim’s status and the threat of a victim’s rape allegation affect people’s endorsement of 
rape myths?   
I propose that system justification theory may be useful in predicting rape myth 
acceptance.  According to system justification theory, people tend to defend existing 
social inequality particularly when that social system is under threat (Jost, Burgess, & 
Mosso, 2001).  If rape myth acceptance is an ideology that legitimizes violence against 
subordinate-group members, then people’s level of rape myth acceptance should fluctuate 
in a manner consistent with system justification theory.  In the following sections, I will 
discuss system justification theory, antecedents to system justification, and how these 
antecedents may relate to rape myth acceptance.   
System Justification Theory 
 For society (or any organization) to function it is important for people to adapt to 
unfavorable policies and outcomes (Jost, 1995).  System justification theory asserts that 
low-status groups can identify with the dominant culture and will defend it even though 
they could gain more power in a new regime (Jost & Banaji, 1994).  Witnessing social 
inequality distresses most people and provokes negative feelings such as guilt, 
helplessness, and anger (Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007).  At the same time, people 
also need to perceive existing social arrangements as fair and legitimate (Jost & Banaji, 
1994; Lerner & Miller, 1978).   
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To alleviate this dissonance, some people use ideologies to legitimize social 
inequality as fair and natural (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Jost, Pelham, 
et al., 2003; McGuire & McGuire, 1991).  For example, people will rationalize that likely 
but unpleasant outcomes become more desirable (“sweet lemons”) and unlikely but 
pleasant outcomes become more undesirable (“sour grapes”).  Kay, Jimenez, and Jost 
(2002) conducted two studies that tested this effect.  In Study 1 partisan and nonpartisan 
participants were surveyed about their attitudes toward Bush and Gore one week before 
the 2000 election.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions in 
which the predicted outcome of the election was manipulated.  After reading predicted 
outcome of the elections, participants were asked, “How desirable or undesirable would it 
be for you if Gore were elected president?” and “How desirable or undesirable would it 
be for you if Bush were elected president?”  Participants used a 9-point scale (1 = 
strongly undesirable; 9 = strongly desirable) to respond to these questions.  Not 
surprisingly, there was a significant main effect of participants’ party loyalty such that 
across conditions Republicans reported that it would be more desirable if Bush were 
president (M = 7.2) than if Gore were president (M = 2.9) and that Democrats reported 
that it would be more desirable if Gore were president (M = 7.2) than if Bush were 
president (M = 2.8).  As a demonstration of “sour grapes,” Republican participants who 
were told that Bush would definitely lose the election reported that it would be less 
desirable if Bush were elected president (M = 5.9) than did the Republican participants 
who were told that Bush would definitely win the election (M = 8.2).  Similarly, 
Democrat participants who were told that Gore would definitely lose the election reported 
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that it would be less desirable if Gore were elected president (M = 6.8) than did Democrat 
participants who were told that Gore would definitely win the election (M = 8.0).   
As a demonstration of “sweet lemons,” Republicans who were told that Gore 
would definitely win reported that it would be more desirable if Gore were president (M 
= 4.4) than did Republicans who were told that Gore would definitely lose (M = 1.8).  
Democrats demonstrated a similar effect although this was only marginally significant.  
Democrats who were told that Bush would definitely win the election reported that it 
would be more desirable if Bush were president (M = 2.0) than did Democrats who were 
told that Bush would definitely lose (M = 3.0).  For both demonstrations of “sour grapes” 
and “sweet lemons,” non-partisan participants’ ratings did not significantly differ across 
condition which indicated that participants must be motivationally invested in the 
outcome to warrant rationalizing the outcome.     
In Study 2, Kay et al. (2002) tested if a favorable tuition decrease would become 
less desirable as it became less likely to happen (“sour grapes”) and that an unfavorable 
tuition increase would become more desirable as it became more likely to happen (“sweet 
lemons”).  Students rated how desirable or undesirable it would be if such a tuition 
change occurred (1 = extremely undesirable; 15 = extremely desirable).  There was a 
main effect in which students rated a tuition decrease as more desirable (M = 11.9) than a 
tuition increase (M = 4.4).  As a demonstration of “sour grapes,” students who were told 
that it was unlikely that the university would lower tuition rated the decrease as less 
desirable (M = 11.0) than did students who were told that it was likely that the university 
would lower tuition (M = 14.5).  As a demonstration of “sweet lemons,” students who 
were told that it was likely that the university would raise tuition rated the increase as 
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more desirable (M = 4.8) than did students who were told that it was unlikely that the 
university would raise tuition (M = 1.8).  Kay et al. concluded that changes in the 
perceived likelihood of an event are associated with changes in the judged desirability of 
that event for people who are invested in the outcome.   
One issue with both of these studies is that it is a between-subjects design and 
thus does not demonstrate how people’s attitudes may shift upon changes in the 
perceived likelihood of an outcome.  Such a within-subjects design would demonstrate 
how resistant or malleable people’s initial judgments are to change.  People’s resistance 
or malleability to change could be related to dispositional traits.  For example, in Kay et 
al.’s (2002) Study 1, it is possible that the Republicans had a different dispositional trait 
than the Democrats that made the Republicans better at rationalizing unfavorable 
outcomes.  Specifically, Republicans in Study 1 demonstrated a more robust “sweet 
lemon” effect than did the Democrats.  This may be consistent with the finding that 
Republicans are more amenable to group inequality and hierarchy than are Democrats 
(Pratto et al., 1994). 
It is important to note that Kay et al. (2002) did not compare the “sweet lemon” 
and “sour grapes” effects between high- and low-status groups.  Such a study would be 
interesting in determining if group status plays a role in people’s perceptions of outcome 
likelihood and how that can affect people’s tendency to rationalize unfavorable outcomes.  
For example, low-status groups may view policies that benefit them as highly unlikely to 
occur and policies that benefit high-status groups as highly likely to occur.  Thus, low-
status groups may rate those policies as relatively less desirable (“sour grapes”) and more 
desirable (“sweet lemon”), respectively.     
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A broader issue with system justification theory (as well as the related social 
dominance theory) is the assertion that low-status groups “prefer” or “desire” unfavorable 
outcomes that benefit high-status groups (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius et al., 2001).  In 
both studies, favorable events were rated as far more desirable than unfavorable events 
despite the likelihood of the favorable events occurring.  It is unclear if the results 
demonstrated that people become more accepting of unfavorable outcomes or prefer 
unfavorable outcomes over favorable ones.  Further, Kay et al. (2002) noted that the 
“sour grapes-sweet lemon” effect was only found in people who were motivated and 
personally invested in the outcome.  Kay et al. did not determine if the participants’ 
change in judged desirability was due to a decrease in their personal investment.  That is, 
upon learning that an unfavorable outcome was likely to happen, the participants may 
have disidentified with the outcome and concluded that the outcome (i.e., politics, tuition) 
was not that important to them.  If this is true, people who disidentify with important 
outcomes may become apathetic and accept injustice more easily.   
  In sum, system justification theory suggests that social inequality is distressing 
to most people and thus, people will use psychological tactics to cope with this distress.  
Specifically, people become more tolerant of social inequality when inequality seems 
likely.  This point is particularly important in understanding how low-status groups can 
accept policies that put them at a disadvantage and how members of both high- and low-
status groups can rationalize social inequality as “the way things are.”            
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Antecedents to System Justification 
 System justification theory has identified factors that encourage people to accept 
and even defend group inequality.  The degree to which people defend group inequality 
depends on (a) a dispositional acceptance of hierarchical relationships (i.e., system 
justification orientation), (b) salience of group stereotypes that legitimize inequality (i.e., 
complementary stereotypes), and (c) situational attacks levied against the system (system 
threat) (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost & Kay, 2005).  Each of these factors can lead to 
increased system justification alone or in combination (Jost & Hunyady, 2005).   
System Justification Orientation 
 As a disposition, some people are more accepting of group hierarchies and see 
group interactions as a zero-sum game (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994).  System justification 
theory states that some people may be more accepting of social arrangements that conflict 
with their own self-interests because “there are hedonic benefits to minimizing the 
unpredictable, unjust, and oppressive aspects of social reality” (Jost & Hunyady, 2005, p. 
261).  Specifically, group hierarchies minimize group conflict in a society and some 
people are more willing to minimize conflict even if it is at their own expense (Overbeck, 
Jost, Mosso, & Flizik, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993).  A system justification orientation 
is driven by people’s identification with the social system (Overbeck et al., 2004) and 
describes people’s acceptance of group inequality (Jost et al., 2001; Jost & Thompson, 
2000).   
A system justification orientation was adapted from a competing theory, social 
dominance theory (Jost & Thompson, 2000; Overbeck et al., 2004).  Whereas system 
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justification theory initially focused on situational factors that provoke people’s support 
for inequality, social dominance theory focused on individual differences in people’s 
quest for social dominance (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1993).  The Social Dominance 
Orientation scale was developed to measure people’s acceptance of ingroup dominance, 
aggression, and control (e.g., “to get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on 
other groups”; “we should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups”) 
(Pratto et al., 1994).  When the Social Dominance Orientation scale was tested, all scale 
items formed a single construct for several predominantly White samples.  Past research 
has shown that dominant groups, such as White males, tend to have a stronger social 
dominance orientation; subordinate groups, such as women and African Americans, tend 
to have a weaker social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994).  People with a strong 
social dominance orientation choose ideologies that strengthen group hierarchies whereas 
people with a weak social dominance orientation choose ideologies that weaken group 
hierarchies (Pratto et al., 1994).  For example, a social dominance orientation has been 
found to correlate with sexist and racist attitudes (Pratto, 1996).   
Whereas Pratto and her colleagues (1994) proposed that a Social Dominance 
Orientation was a personality trait, Jost and Thompson (2000) proposed that a Social 
Dominance Orientation was a combination of a person’s personality and his or her 
position in the hierarchy.  Jost and Thompson tested the Social Dominance Orientation 
scale using White and African-American samples. Consistent with their prediction, Jost 
and Thompson found that the scale items split into two subfactors which they named 
“Group-Based Dominance” (e.g., “to get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step 
on other groups”) and “Opposition to Equality” (e.g., “we should do what we can to 
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equalize conditions for different groups”).  The Group-Based Dominance subscale 
assesses belief that it is okay for one’s group to dominate other groups and thus, is a purer 
measure of a social dominance orientation (Jost & Thompson, 2000).  The Opposition to 
Equality subscale assesses the belief that group inequality is acceptable without 
stipulating whose group receives unfair treatment and thus, is a purer measure of a 
system justification orientation (Jost & Thompson, 2000).  Jost and Thompson found that 
correlations between Group-Based Dominance scores and Opposition to Equality scores 
were stronger for White samples than they were for African-American samples.  Because 
Whites represent the dominant culture, opposing equality bolsters ingroup dominance; 
because African Americans represent the subordinate culture, opposing equality conflicts 
with ingroup dominance.  Based on Jost and Thompson’s findings, social dominance 
theorists changed the definition of a social dominance orientation to a “general desire for 
unequal relations among social groups, regardless of whether this means ingroup 
domination or ingroup subordination” (Sidanius et al., 2001, p. 312).  This new definition 
is a shift toward system justification theory and closely approximates the definition of a 
system justification orientation (Jost et al., 2001; Jost & Thompson 2000).   
Complementary Stereotypes 
Another antecedent to system justification is the salience of complementary 
stereotypes.  Controlling for individual differences in a system justification orientation, 
some people use complementary stereotypes (and self-stereotypes) to justify social 
inequality (Jost & Kay, 2005; Kay & Jost, 2003; Kay et al., 2002; Kay, Jost, Mandisodza, 
Sherman, Petrocelli, & Johnson, 2007).  Dominant-group members are ascribed agentic 
traits (e.g., competent, assertive, intelligent) and subordinate-group members are ascribed 
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communal traits (e.g., warm, friendly, honest) (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996).  
Complementary stereotypes justify social inequality in several ways.  First, 
complementary stereotypes state that groups are well-suited for their prescribed social 
roles (Eagly & Steffen, 1984) and that these social roles are accepted as natural, 
inevitable, and fair (Jost & Banaji, 1994).  Complementary stereotypes seem to contain a 
“kernel of truth” about gender differences: women are assumed to be more communal 
and less agentic than men are because of their biological role as mothers (Eagly & 
Mladinic, 1989).  People universally apply complementary stereotypes to ethnic and 
regional groups as well (Kay et al., 2007).  For example, other low-status groups (i.e., 
Southern Italians, Northern Englanders, and Sephardic Jews) are assumed to be more 
communal and less agentic than are their high-status counterparts (i.e., Northern Italians, 
Southern Englanders, and Ashkenzi Jews, respectively) (Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, 
& Mosso, 2005).  This suggests that complementary stereotypes are not specific to men 
and women’s biology but rather characterize status differences (Jost et al., 2005).   
Second, complementary stereotypes prescribe traits for men and women that 
maintain men’s authority over women and women’s dependence on men (Glick & Fiske, 
2001).  Agentic and communal traits have been conceptualized using dichotomous terms 
that describe power relationships: instrumental power/dyadic power (Glick & Fiske, 
1996), competence/warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), self-profitable/other-
profitable (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990), status-enhancing/status-diminishing (Hochschild, 
1983/2003), and perhaps, dominance/submission.  All of these conceptualizations 
prescribe how people should be in a dominant/subordinate relationship (Jackman, 1994).  
Specifically, agentic traits such as “intelligent,” “assertive,” and “cold” can command 
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respect and intimidate others, whereas communal traits such as “considerate,” “honest,” 
and “naïve” can put people at ease and invoke patronization (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; 
Fiske et al., 2002; Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jackman, 1994; Ridgeway, 2001).  Within this 
power relationship, dominants’ and subordinates’ have feelings for each other and these 
have been categorized into four types of ambivalent prejudice: admiration, paternalistic 
prejudice, envious prejudice, and contemptuous prejudice (Fiske et al., 2002; Glick & 
Fiske, 2001).  Admiration is subordinates’ grateful deference paid to dominants.  Paternal 
prejudice is dominants’ kindness and patronization of subordinates for their good 
behavior.  Although dominants may have benevolent feelings toward subordinates, 
dominants do not respect subordinates as equals (Glick & Fiske, 2001).  Envious 
prejudice is dominants’ fear of competent subordinates who threaten dominant power 
(Glick & Fiske, 2001).  Dominants may use this threat to justify retaliating against 
subordinates to stabilize the status quo.  Contemptuous prejudice is dominants’ hostility 
toward incompetent subordinates whom dominants perceive as ungrateful or a drain on 
resources.  This power relationship and associated ambivalent prejudice make it very 
difficult for subordinates to successfully challenge and overthrow the status quo (Glick & 
Fiske, 2001; Ridgeway, 2001).  
 Third, complementary stereotypes justify social inequality by assigning positive 
and negative traits to each group (Kay & Jost, 2003; Kay et al., 2007). This creates the 
illusion of equality because “no one has it all” (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2005; 
Jost & Kay, 2005).  Kay, Jost, and Young (2005) found that people used complementary 
stereotypes to simultaneously derogate and compensate “losers” and “winners.”  
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four stories.  The four stories varied 
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in that they expressed a causal link between the trait and the outcome (causal vs. not 
causal) as well as the complementarity of the traits (complementary vs. 
noncomplementary).  Story 1 described smart-but-poor Mary and dumb-but-rich Sarah 
(causal and complementary).  Story 2 described smart-and-rich Mary and dumb-and-poor 
Sarah (causal and noncomplementary).  Story 3 described smart-and-attractive Mary and 
dumb-and-unattractive Sarah (not causal and noncomplementary).  Story 4 described 
smart-and-unattractive Mary and dumb-but-attractive Sarah (not causal and 
complementary).  After reading one of these four stories, participants completed a 
measure of system justification (e.g., “Most policies serve the greater good.”) using a 9-
point scale.  When there was a causal link between the trait and the outcome, participants 
who read the noncomplementary story (smart+rich; dumb+poor) reported higher system 
justification (M = 5.6) than did the participants who read the complementary story 
(smart+poor; dumb+rich; M = 4.8).  When there was no causal link between the trait and 
outcome, participants who read the complementary story (smart+unattractive; 
dumb+attractive) reported higher system justification (M = 5.9) than did participants who 
read the noncomplementary story (smart+attractive; dumb+unattractive; M = 5.2).  Kay et 
al. concluded that complementary stereotypes praise “winners” and derogate “losers” on 
traits that are relevant to outcomes but derogate “winners” and praise “losers” on traits 
that are irrelevant to outcomes.   
In regard to gender inequality, Jost and Kay (2005) found that activating 
complementary stereotypes would increase “low-status” participants’ perception that 
inequality is fair.  Male and female participants were assigned to one of nine groups.  
Participants were exposed to items from Glick and Fiske’s (1996) Ambivalent Sexism 
14 
Inventory.  Group 1 rated their agreement with four items that were drawn from the 
Benevolent Sexism subscale (e.g., “Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior 
moral sensibility.”). Group 2 rated their agreement with four items that were drawn from 
the Hostile Sexism subscale (e.g., “Most women do not fully appreciate all that men do 
for them.”).  Group 3 rated their agreement with two benevolent sexist items and two 
hostile sexist items.  Group 4 participants rated their agreement with a set of positive, 
gender-neutral traits (“resourcefulness,” “creativity,” tactfulness,” and “realism”).  These 
traits were presented in a similar fashion as the benevolent sexist items (e.g., “Women, 
compared to men tend to be more realistic.”).  Participants in Groups 5–8 read the same 
statements as the participants in conditions 1–4 but were asked to proofread the items and 
rate the degree to which they thought the items were “ambiguously worded.”  Thus, 
whereas participants in Groups 1–4 endorsed their agreement with items, participants in 
Groups 5–8 were only exposed to the items.  Participants in Group 9 did not read any of 
the gender-related items.  Afterwards, all participants completed a diffuse measure of 
system justification in which they endorsed their level of support for the United States 
(e.g., “In general, the American political system operates as it should.”).  These items 
were measured on a 9-point Likert scale.  Results indicated that endorsement to the 
gender-related statement compared to exposure to the statement had no effect on 
participants’ endorsement of diffuse system justification.  Collapsing across endorsement 
and exposure conditions, men perceived the American system to be more fair (M = 5.0) 
than did women (M = 4.6).  Examining the effect of specific gender-related statements, 
the results indicated that women’s system justification scores were affected by their 
exposure to the different types of gender-related statements (Means 3.9–5.1) whereas 
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men’s system justification scores remained relatively stable across condition (Means 4.7–
5.2).  Specifically, women who were exposed to benevolent stereotypes reported 
significantly higher agreement with the pro-U.S. statements (M = 5.1) than did women 
who were exposed to positive, gender-neutral traits (M = 3.9).  Further, women in the 
benevolent stereotype condition reported the same level of agreement with pro-U.S. 
statements (M = 5.1) as had men in the same condition (M = 4.7).   Jost and Kay 
concluded that activation of communal and benevolent stereotypes can increase women’s 
system justification and that positive gender stereotypes that give women an advantage 
over men can flatter some women into supporting an unfair system.   
This could convey a positive view of people such that people are more supportive 
of a system that is balanced and fair.  However, the results from these studies contradict 
this.  Because men’s system justification remained stable across gender-stereotyped 
conditions whether they were exposed to benevolent, hostile, or no stereotypes about 
women, this suggests that men were more supportive of a system that benefited them 
rather than about fairness.  Apparent fairness, as conveyed by assigning women traits that 
value them over men, however, raised women’s support for the status quo.  In this sense, 
benevolent stereotypes about women and men that counterweigh lower status have the 
insidious effect of getting the lower-status group to perhaps inadvertently accept their 
lower status. 
In sum, there is evidence that complementary stereotypes are not accurate 
descriptions of men and women per se; rather, complementary stereotypes describe status 
roles.  Complementary stereotypes rationalize group inequality and create an 
interpersonal script that maintains group inequality.  Further, complementary stereotypes 
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flatter subordinate-group members who know their place and justify the punishment of 
those who do not.              
System Threat 
 A final proposed antecedent to system justification is a threat to the status quo or 
system.  Just as people identify with their own interests (Allport, 1954/1958) and the 
interests of those who are similar to them (Condor, 1990), people can also identify with 
the overall system (Jost & Banaji, 1994).  Threats to the system encourage people to 
psychologically defend the system and legitimate it as the way things should be (Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).  One way people psychologically defend the 
system is to endorse complementary stereotypes which justify the status quo (Jost, 
Glaser, et al., 2003).  For example, Israeli participants either read about Israel’s weak 
national security (high system threat) or strong national security (low system threat).  
Participants then rated high-status Israelis and low-status Israelis on measures of agency 
and communality.  Agency (“efficient,” “responsible,” “productive,” “active,” 
“dominant,” “educated,” “ambitious,” and “intelligent”) and communality (“emotional,” 
“honest,” “friendly,” “extraverted,” “religious,” and “happy”) were measured using 9-
point scales (e.g., 1 = extremely irresponsible; 9 = extremely responsible).  Participants in 
the high system threat condition rated the high-status Israelis as more agentic 
(“responsible”) and less communal (“emotional”); conversely, they rated low-status 
Israelis as being less agentic and more communal.  Increased complementary stereotype 
differentiation positively correlated with the perceived legitimacy of the current system 
(Jost et al., 2005).  This suggests that when people perceive that the system is breaking 
down, they try to relieve this psychological distress by endorsing group-status 
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differences.  It is unknown if these participants increased endorsement of complementary 
stereotypes because they were trying to bring order to a threatening and chaotic situation, 
or if they assumed that the system broke down because group hierarchy was not upheld 
and so the solution was to restore it, or for another reason.  Although not yet tested, it 
follows that people who have a strong system justification orientation would be more 
sensitive and reactive to threats against the system then would people who have a weak 
system justification orientation.     
 In sum, several factors encourage people to support group inequality.  Some 
people have a system justification orientation and accept group hierarchy even if that 
entails holding a lower status.  Complementary stereotypes remind people that gender 
inequality exists not because the system is unfair, but because men and women 
“naturally” differ and therefore should occupy different roles.  When the group hierarchy 
or system is threatened, people use complementary stereotypes to remind themselves and 
to remind others that group inequality exists for good reasons.   Each of these factors can 
lead to increased system justification alone or in combination (Jost & Hunyady, 2005).   
CHAPTER 2:  System Justification Antecedents of Rape Myth Acceptance 
 If rape myths are ideologies that justify gender inequality, then the same factors 
that increase system justification should also increase rape myth acceptance.  Jost and 
colleagues identified a system justification orientation, complementary stereotypes, and 
threat to the status quo as antecedents to system justification (Jost & Kay, 2005; Jost & 
Thompson, 2000; Jost et al., 2005).  Therefore, potential antecedents to rape myth 
acceptance are a) a system justification orientation, b) complementary stereotypes in the 
sexual domain and c) degree of threat to the status quo.   
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System Justification Orientation and Rape Myth Acceptance 
 A system justification orientation is people’s acceptance of inequality, regardless 
of whether they belong to the dominant or subordinate group (Jost et al., 2001; Jost & 
Thompson, 2000; Overbeck et al., 2004).  A system justification orientation is 
conceptually similar to a social dominance orientation (Jost & Thompson, 2000; Sidanius 
et al., 2001) such that people with a strong system justification orientation choose 
ideologies that strengthen group hierarchy (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994).  There is evidence 
that people’s motivation to maintain group inequality is associated with rape myth 
acceptance (Lambert & Raichle, 2000; Pratto et al., 1994).  Pratto et al. (1994) found that 
rape myth acceptance correlated with scores on the full Social Dominance Orientation 
scale for both male and female participants (average r = .47).  Lambert and Raichle 
(2000) also found that participants’ scores on the full Social Dominance Orientation scale 
predicted higher blame for a female acquaintance rape victim, but lower blame for the 
male perpetrator.  A social dominance orientation was a stronger predictor of victim 
blaming than was participants’ belief in a just world and their belief in personal 
responsibility (i.e., Protestant Work Ethic).  Participant gender did not moderate the 
relationship between social dominance orientation and victim blaming.  However, female 
participants reported less victim blaming, more perpetrator blaming, and scored lower on 
the full Social Dominance Orientation scale than did men.  Because the full Social 
Dominance Orientation scale is comprised of two subscales (Jost & Thompson, 2000), it 
would have been informative if Lambert and Raichle had examined the social dominance 
and system justification subscales separately.  Although Lambert and Raichle did not 
measure the participants’ perceptions of the status of the victim and perpetrator in the 
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date-rape scenario, their results suggest that victim blaming and perpetrator leniency are 
related to people’s desire to legitimate gender inequality.       
Based on the findings of Lambert and Raichle (2000), it follows that the more 
people identify with the social system (regardless of his or her status within the system), 
the more they will legitimize sexual assault if the perpetrator is higher status than the 
victim.  Lambert and Raichle’s findings suggest that because men, in general, are higher 
status than are women, people with a system justification orientation will show leniency 
toward the male perpetrator.  If, however, the perpetrator is of lower status than the 
victim, people with a system justification orientation may be more likely to blame the 
perpetrator (LaFree, 1980; Patton & Snyder-Yuly, 2007).  Consistent with this argument, 
past research has found that African-American perpetrators were viewed as more 
responsible for sexual assault when victims were White rather than African-American 
(Ugwuegbu, 1979; Wolfgang & Riedel, 1975).  This finding, however, was moderated by 
the participant’s race; White participants thought that White victims were considered 
more truthful when the perpetrator was Black (Varelas & Foley, 1998).  Interestingly, 
African-American participants were more lenient toward a White rapist than a Black 
rapist. 
Complementary Stereotypes and Rape Myth Acceptance 
System justification theory suggests the salience of complementary stereotypes 
can increase people’s satisfaction with the status quo (Jost & Kay, 2005) and people are 
more likely to endorse complementary stereotypes when the status quo is threatened (Jost 
et al., 2005).  Similarly, the salience of complementary stereotypes may increase rape 
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myth acceptance and a threat to the status quo (i.e., a rape allegation) may increase some 
people’s endorsement of complementary stereotypes. 
Previous research has found that rape myth acceptance correlates with ambivalent 
sexism toward women and toward men (Abrams, Viki, Masser, & Bohner, 2003; 
Chapleau et al., 2007, 2008; Viki, Abrams, & Masser, 2003).  Ambivalent sexism is a 
construct composed of both hostile and benevolent attitudes toward women and toward 
men (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 1999).  Hostile sexism toward women reflects men’s fear of 
women using their sexual allure to usurp power; benevolent sexism reflects men’s 
acknowledgement that heterosexual men need women as romantic partners and mothers 
(Glick & Fiske, 1996, 1997).  Hostile sexism is the “stick” that derogates women who 
threaten men’s authority; benevolent sexism is the “carrot” that praises women who 
support men’s power.  Together, hostile and benevolent sexism justify the status quo of 
male domination by asserting that women should not be in power and that they should be 
content in their lower status in society (Glick et al., 2000).   
According to Glick and Fiske’s (1999) ambivalent sexism theory, generally 
speaking, women’s relationship with men, the more powerful outgroup, is also conflicted.  
Women are thought to resent men for their greater power and higher social status, yet, in 
heterosexual relationships, depend on men as protectors, providers, and romantic 
partners. Hostile sexism toward men reflects women’s dissatisfaction with the status quo 
and characterizes men as exploitative and controlling.  Benevolent sexism toward men 
justifies women seeking romantic relationships with men by idealizing men as heroes 
who need women’s love and support (Glick & Fiske, 1999).  Unlike ambivalent sexism 
toward women, Glick and Fiske did not conceptualize hostile and benevolent sexism 
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toward men as the “carrot” and “stick” that keep men in line.  Rather, both hostile and 
benevolent sexism are associated with gender inequality because they evince men’s 
dominance and natural propensity for leadership (Glick et al., 2004).   
For ambivalent sexism toward women, Chapleau et al. (2007) found that rape 
myth acceptance positively correlated with hostile sexism and one subfactor of 
benevolent sexism characterizing women as more moral and innocent than are men (i.e., 
complementary gender differentiation toward women).  Hostile sexism toward women 
denigrates women as manipulative and trying to gain power over men.  People who view 
women this way also may believe that rape victims use a rape allegation as a weapon 
against men.  Complementary gender differentiation, the belief that women should be 
ladylike, may translate into the perception that women who violate this stereotypic role 
are partially responsible for making themselves vulnerable to sexual attack by drinking 
alcohol or wearing revealing clothing.  Rape myth acceptance was negatively associated 
with protective paternalism, the benevolent attitude that men should use their power to 
protect women.  People who believe that men should use their higher status and power to 
protect women may be more likely to blame the male perpetrator because they perceive 
him to be stronger, quicker, and more powerful than she.  
For ambivalent sexism toward men, rape myth acceptance correlated positively 
with two subfactors of benevolent sexism (Chapleau et al., 2007).  These subfactors 
characterized men as being braver than women are (complementary gender 
differentiation) and necessary as romantic partners for women (heterosexual intimacy).  
Those who admired men for their masculine attributes of strength, risk-taking, and 
stoicism were less likely to hold men accountable for rape.  Chapleau et al. suggested that 
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participants may have viewed the aggressor as a potential romantic partner rather than a 
rapist, or that victims were seeking male attention in attempts to secure a mate. 
Furthermore, for female participants (but not male participants) rape myth acceptance 
correlated positively with maternalism, the benevolent belief that women should protect 
and nurture men.  For women, nurturing men is a way to gain men’s favor and thus 
access men’s power, albeit indirectly (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Thus, women who hold 
benevolent sexist attitudes toward men may turn against female victims and support male 
aggressors due to their admiration for men, their belief that women are unfulfilled 
without a male partner, and their need to nurture men (Chapleau et al., 2007).   
 Rape myth acceptance did not correlate with hostile sexism toward men.  
Interestingly, resentment of male power and domination was not negatively associated 
with rape myth acceptance.  This suggests that although some participants characterized 
men as exploiters of women, this did not translate as sympathy toward rape victims or 
outrage toward rapists. Although some may have supported female rape victims, others 
may have believed that because men are inherently bad, women must beware potential 
victimization by men.     
 Interestingly, ambivalent sexist attitudes toward men and women are quite 
similar: Both men and women are characterized as power-hungry and manipulative, but 
also needing protection and love (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 1999).  Despite these similarities, 
ambivalent sexism supports men’s higher status over women (Glick et al., 2004).  
Therefore, in the study of rape myth acceptance, specific sexist attitudes may be less 
important than are status differences that are conveyed through complementary 
stereotypes (e.g., Conway et al., 1996).   
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System Threat and Rape Myth Acceptance 
 The higher the status of the perpetrator relative to the victim, the more likely 
people will endorse rape myths (Du Mont et al., 2003; George & Martinez, 2002; 
Yamawaki et al., 2007).  Research has not shown how people respond when the victim 
intends to report the perpetrator to the police.  Such an act by the victim may be 
perceived as a threat, not only to the perpetrator, but to men’s higher status and the status 
quo of gender relations.  Therefore, the greater the threat the victim poses to the 
perpetrator (e.g., reporting him to the police), the more some people may endorse rape 
myths to mitigate the threat.              
 I propose a model of rape myth acceptance in which a system justification 
orientation, victim’s relative status, and system threat contribute to rape myth acceptance.  
A system justification perspective of rape myth acceptance could parsimoniously 
combine disparate studies that has linked rape myth acceptance with sexism, social 
dominance, and status into on theoretical model.  This model could then test causal 
predictions about what factors increase rape myth acceptance.    
 To test this model, a date-rape scenario was created that manipulated the relative 
status of the victim compared to the perpetrator as well as what the victim decided to do 
after the rape.  Study 1 pre-tested the date-rape scenario.  Study 2 tested the hypothesis 
that participants with a strong system justification orientation would be more motivated 
to espouse rape myths when a lower-status victim threatened to report a higher-status 
perpetrator to the police.   
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CHAPTER 3:  Study 1 
 In Study 1, the date-rape scenario was pretested to determine (1) if manipulating 
the type of school Kate and Jason attended would be associated with different levels of 
social status, (2) if participants rated one gender as having more status than the other, 
controlling for the type of school they attended, and (3) if it was clear that Jason sexually 
assaulted Kate.  For the date-rape scenario to be effective, participants should rate Kate 
and Jason attending a prestigious university as having the highest social status, rate Kate 
and Jason attending a state college as having lower social status, and rate Kate and Jason 
who dropped out of state college but attends technical school part time as having the 
lowest social status.  Further, participants should rate Kate and Jason as having the same 
social status when they attend the same type of school.  Participants should also strongly 
agree that Jason raped Kate and that she did not consent to sex.    
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 115 male and female students (67.8% female, n = 78) from a 
Midwestern university (Mage = 18.8 years, SD = 1.13).  Most were Caucasian (85.2%, n = 
98), 6 were African American, 5 were Mexican American, 2 were Asian American, 1 was 
Native American, 1 identified as “Other,” and 2 did not answer this question.  
Participants received course extra credit for their participation.   
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Measures 
 Measure of social status.  Participants rated the social status of Jason and Kate 
when they were described as the following:  a junior at a private, prestigious university; a 
junior at a state college; dropped out of state college and now takes classes at a technical 
college, part-time (e.g., “Kate is junior at a prestigious, private university.”).  Participants 
were asked to think about how most people would rate Jason and Kate’s social status 
when making their ratings.  See Appendix A.  Participants used an 11-point Likert scale 
(0 = No social status, 5 = Some social status, 10 = A great deal of social status) to 
indicate their responses.   
Date-rape scenario.  Participants read a date-rape scenario about Jason and Kate; 
there was no mention of where Jason and Kate went to school or what Kate decided to do 
after Jason assaulted her.   
Kate and her friend, Laura, went to a college party.  At the party, Laura 
introduced Kate to Jason.  Kate and Jason hit it off immediately and spent the 
night talking, laughing, and flirting with each other.  As Kate and her friend, 
Laura, were leaving the party Jason asked Kate for her number and if she wanted 
to go out with him.  Kate readily agreed.  The next weekend, Kate and Jason had 
dinner together and later went to Jason’s apartment to watch a movie.  As they 
watched the movie they started kissing.  When Jason started undressing Kate, she 
said she was uncomfortable and that she wanted him to stop.  Jason did not stop, 
however.  Although Kate resisted, Jason continued undressing her, held her 
down and had sexual intercourse with Kate. 
 
Perception of Sexual Aggression. Participants used an 11-point Likert scale (0 = 
Not at all, 10 = Definitely) to respond to two questions regarding their perception of a 
sexually aggressive act in the scenario (“Do you think that Kate consented to having sex 
with Jason?” and “Do you think Jason raped Kate?”).   
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Demographics.  Participants were asked to identify their sex, age, current 
relationship status, and ethnic background. 
Procedure 
 Two female experimenters distributed the surveys to the participants at the 
beginning of class.  Each survey contained an information sheet about the survey, the 
social status perception measure, the date-rape scenario, the two items perception of 
sexual aggression items, and the demographic measure.  One experimenter stated that 
participation was voluntary and that participants should not share their responses with 
their classmates to ensure privacy.  On the last page of the survey, there was an extra 
credit slip; students were instructed to print their names and tear off that sheet of paper.  
Upon completion, the participants passed the surveys and the extra credit slips forward to 
the experimenters en masse.  One experimenter debriefed the participants and left copies 
of the debriefing sheet at the front of the room.  Extra credit was given to all participants 
who filled out the extra credit slip.    
Results and Discussion 
To determine participants’ perceptions of social status between Kate and Jason 
attending three types of schools, a 6 (item) x 2 (participant gender) mixed-model 
ANOVA was calculated with the six items as a within-subjects factor, and participant 
gender as a between-subjects factor. Assumptions of sphericity were violated so a 
Huynh-Feldt correction is reported.  The Item x Participant Gender interaction was 
significant (F(2.3, 260.1) = 5.09, p = .005).  Women’s ratings of social status were more 
extreme than men’s ratings.1 Specifically, women rated Kate attending a private 
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university as having higher status (t(113) = 2.20, p = .03) and rated Kate attending 
technical college as having lower social status (t(113) = -2.51, p = .01) than what men 
had reported.  Women also rated Jason attending technical college as having lower social 
status than what men had reported (t(113) = -2.02, p = .05).  Women’s status ratings of 
Kate and Jason attending a state college did not significantly differ from men’s ratings 
(ps > .30).  There was no main effect for participant gender (F(1, 113) = 0.005, p = .94) 
indicating that collapsing across items, women and men’s ratings were not significantly 
different.   
There was a main effect for the type of item (F(2.3, 260.1) = 253.3, p < .001).  
Participants rated Kate and Jason as having the same status level when they attended the 
same institution: there was no effect of one character having more status than the other 
due to their gender (all ps > .10).  Of the three types of schools, participants rated Kate 
and Jason attending a private, prestigious university as having the most status (MKate = 
8.24; MJason = 8.39).  Participants rated Kate and Jason taking classes at a technical 
college, part-time as having the least status (MKate = 4.27; MJason = 4.13).  Participants 
rated Kate and Jason attending a state college as having mid-level status (MKate = 6.26; 
MJason = 6.39).  All pairwise comparisons between academic institutions were statistically 
significant (ps < .001; see Table 1).   
In regards to participants’ perception of rape in the date-rape scenario, 
participants thought that Jason raped Kate (M = 9.70, SD = .74) and did not think that 
Kate consented to having sex with Jason (M = .22, SD = .59).  Comparing male and 
female participants, there was no difference in their perception of rape (Mmen = 9.68; 
Mwomen = 9.71; t(113) = .20, p = .84).  Eighty-one percent of participants (n = 93)  
28 
TABLE 1 
Mean Values of Social Status Based on School Type and Character Gender 
           
 
Type of School            Women     Men              Total  
Private University 
  Kate  8.51a (.16)  7.97b  (.21) 8.24ab  (.12) 
  Jason  8.62a (.16) 8.16ab (.24) 8.39ab  (.14) 
State College 
  Kate  6.31c (.14) 6.23c  (.20) 6.26c   (.12) 
  Jason  6.51c (.15) 6.27c  (.21) 6.39c   (.13) 
Dropped out/Tech School 
  Kate  3.92d  (.16) 4.62e  (.21) 4.27de  (.14) 
  Jason  3.85d  (.15) 4.40e  (.25) 4.13de  (.14) 
____________________________________________________________ 
Note. Judgments were made on an 11-point scale (0 = No social status, 10 = A great deal  
of social status).  The values in parentheses are standard errors.  Means that do not share  
subscripts differ at p < .05.   
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definitely thought that Jason raped Kate (i.e., gave the highest rating of 10). Another 
10.4% (n = 12) gave the next highest rating of 9, and another 7.8% (n = 9) gave the 
rating of 8.  Only one person, a female participant, was unsure if Jason raped Kate (i.e., 
gave the midpoint rating of 5).  In sum, 91.3% (n = 105) gave the two highest ratings to 
express their certainty that Jason raped Kate.  
For participants’ perception of consent, men rated Kate as more likely to have 
consented to sex than did women, but this difference was marginally significant (Mmen = 
.38; Mwomen = .14; t(53.2) = -1.81, p = .08).  Ninety-one percent (n = 71) of women 
responded “not at all” (rating of 0) whereas only 73% (n = 27) of men responded “not at 
all.”  Approximately 19% of male participants (n = 7), however, responded with the next 
lowest rating of “1” compared to 5.1% (n = 4) of female participants.  Only four 
participants (two women and two men) gave a rating of “2” and another two participants 
(one woman and one man) gave a rating of “3.”  No one responded that they were unsure 
if Kate consented to sex (i.e., midpoint value of 5).  Overall, 94.8% (n = 109) of male and 
female participants gave the two lowest ratings to express their certainty that Kate did not 
consent to have sex with Jason. 
 These results suggest that manipulating the type of school that Kate and Jason 
attended in the date-rape scenario would be an adequate manipulation of their social 
status.  There was no gender difference in social status between Kate and Jason 
controlling for the type of school they attended.  The results also suggest that the scenario 
was written so that most people would agree that Jason raped Kate and that Kate did not 
consent to have sex with Jason. 
 
30 
CHAPTER 4:  Study 2 
 The goal of this study is to examine how the victim’s status and the threat of a 
victim’s rape allegation affect people’s rape myth acceptance, particularly for people with 
a strong system justification orientation.  Participants read a date-rape scenario in which 
the victim is the same status, higher status, or lower status than the perpetrator.  
Participants also read what the victim decides to do after the perpetrator rapes her:  tell no 
one about the rape, tell a mutual friend, or report the perpetrator to the police.  I 
hypothesized a three-way interaction between participant’s System Justification 
Orientation, victim’s relative status, and threat to perpetrator: high-System Justification 
Orientation participants who are in the condition in which the victim is lower status than 
the perpetrator but decides to report him to the police will report higher rape myth 
acceptance than will high-System Justification Orientation participants who are in the 
condition in which the lower-status victim decides to tell no one. 
 Because rape myths are stereotypes about men, women, and rape, in general, I 
also examined participants’ victim blaming attitudes that were specific to the victim 
named in the scenario.  I hypothesized that participants with a strong system justification 
orientation would be more motivated to blame the victim in the scenario when that victim 
was lower status and she threatened to report the perpetrator to the police.   
 I was also interested in determining if people mitigate the threat of a lower-status 
victim reporting a higher-status perpetrator to the police by espousing attitudes that 
disregard gender inequality.  Gender-specific system justification assesses people’s 
perceptions of gender equality in the United States (Jost & Kay, 2005).  Similar to the 
first two hypotheses, I hypothesized that participants with a strong system justification 
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orientation would be more motivated to report that women in the United States have the 
same opportunities as do men when a lower-status victim threatened to report a higher-
status perpetrator to the police.  
 To determine if System Justification Orientation differs from Social Dominance 
Orientation in its relationship to legitimizing rape, I conducted the same analyses 
substituting System Justification Orientation with Social Dominance Orientation.2 That 
is, participants’ Social Dominance Orientation, participant gender, victim’s status, and 
the threat of a rape allegation predicted participants’ rape myth acceptance, victim blame, 
and gender-specific system justification.  I hypothesized that the pattern of results for 
rape myth acceptance, victim blame, and gender-specific system justification would be 
different for System Justification Orientation and Social Dominance Orientation.  
Because Social Dominance Orientation measures group dominance, I hypothesized that 
men with a strong Social Dominance Orientation would report higher rape myth 
acceptance, victim blame, and gender-specific system justification regardless of relative 
status of the victim and the degree of threat she posed to the perpetrator (i.e., Social 
Dominance Orientation x gender interaction).  If the analyses for Social Dominance 
Orientation and System Justification Orientation showed the same pattern of results, 
however, then it may not be important to separate these constructs.       
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 373 students from a medium-sized Midwestern Catholic 
university (53.9%, n = 201) and people from the U.S. who completed the survey online (n 
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= 172).  University participants received extra credit in an Introductory Psychology 
course; online participants did not receive compensation for their participation.  Overall, 
participants were predominately female (60.3%, n = 225) and White (81.2%, n = 303); 
the median age was 19 years (M = 22.60, SD = 7.77).  There were an equal number of 
female university and online participants; however, there were more male university 
participants (60.1%) than male online participants (χ2(4) = 3.85, p = .05).  University and 
online samples did not differ in ethnic composition.  University participants were 
younger (M = 20.07, SD = 5.01) than online participants (M = 25.55, SD = 9.25; t(371) = 
7.24, p < .001).  University participants were also wealthier than online participants (χ2(4) 
= 43.73, p < .001).  University participants comprised 72.7% of those who reported an 
annual income over $100,000.  Conversely, online participants comprised 76.8% of those 
who reported an annual income of less than $25,000.  
The median time to complete the survey was 21 minutes (M = 25.52, SD = 24.78).  
University participants completed the survey faster (M = 20.59, SD = 4.28) than did 
online participants (M = 31.28, SD = 35.39; t(371) = 4.25, p < .001).  Participants who 
were at 99th percentile  of the amount of time spent completing the survey (< 103.31 
minutes, n = 3) were excluded from analyses leaving 370 participants.   
Procedure 
Student participants completed the survey in a computer lab.  A maximum of ten 
participants completed the survey during each scheduled session.  A female experimenter 
greeted the participants and they were seated at a computer.  The experimenter explained 
the participants’ rights and instructions on how to access the survey.  Participants 
accessed the survey website, read the information sheet online, and completed the full 
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Social Dominance Orientation Scale.  They were then asked to select their birthdate from 
nine choices to be assigned to condition.  Based on their selection, participants read one 
of the nine date-rape scenarios.  Afterwards, they completed the measure of victim and 
perpetrator blame, Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale–Short Form, and the measure of 
gender-specific system justification.  The items within each of these scales were 
presented in random order.  After the participants completed the survey, a debriefing 
form appeared on the computer screen.  The female experimenter gave them an extra-
credit slip and thanked them for their participation.   
Non-student participants completed the survey that was posted on the following 
websites: Online Psychology Research (www.onlinepsychresearch.co.uk), Social 
Psychology Network (www.socialpsychology.org/expts.htm), and the Web Experiment 
List (genpsylab-wexlist.unizh.ch/).  The procedure was the same as for the student 
participants but without the direction of an experimenter. 
Measures   
System Justification Orientation and Social Dominance Orientation.  Participants 
first completed the full Social Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto et al., 1994).  The full 
Social Dominance Orientation scale has 16 items and contains two subscales that assess a 
System Justification Orientation and a Social Dominance Orientation (Jost & Thompson, 
2000; see Appendix B).  System Justification Orientation is the belief that group 
inequality is acceptable without stipulating whose group receives unfair treatment (e.g., 
“We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups” reverse-scored).  
Social Dominance Orientation is the belief that it is acceptable for one’s group to 
dominate other groups (e.g., “To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on 
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other groups”).  Participants indicated their response on a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all 
agree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 9 = Very much agree).  Jost and Thompson reported 
coefficient alphas for System Justification Orientation and Social Dominance Orientation 
as .85 and .84, respectively.  For this study, the coefficient alphas for System Justification 
Orientation and Social Dominance Orientation were .83 and .79, respectively.  System 
Justification Orientation and Social Dominance Orientation scores were positively 
skewed (System Justification Orientation: Skew = .56, SE Skew = .13; Social Dominance 
Orientation: Skew = .63, SE Skew = .13).  These scores were corrected using a log-
transformation.3  
Date-rape scenarios.  Participants read one of nine date-rape scenarios depicting 
Kate and Jason.  The date-rape scenarios were adapted from a set of materials by Abrams 
et al. (2003) and Yamawaki et al. (2007).  Kate and Jason’s status were manipulated 
through the type of school they attended.  In the scenario in which Kate is higher status 
than is Jason, Kate attends a prestigious, private university whereas Jason dropped out of 
college and attends a technical college part-time.  In the scenario in which Kate is lower 
status, Kate dropped out of college and now attends technical college part-time whereas 
Jason attends a private university.  In the scenario in which Kate and Jason are the same 
status, both are juniors at a state college.  The threat to the perpetrator was manipulated 
through Kate’s actions after Jason sexually assaults her.  At the end of the scenario, Kate 
decides that it is important to do one of the following: tell no one about the rape (no 
threat to Jason), tell a mutual friend about the assault (mid-level threat to Jason), or report 
the rape to the police and press charges against Jason (high threat to Jason).     
Kate [is a junior at a prestigious, private university][is a junior at a state 
college][dropped out of college but now takes classes at a local technical college 
35 
part-time].  She and her friend, Laura, went to a college party.  At the party, Laura 
introduced Kate to Jason, a friend of Laura’s family.  Jason [is a junior at a 
prestigious, private university][is also a junior at a state college][dropped out of 
college but now takes classes at a local technical college part-time].  Kate and 
Jason hit it off immediately and spent the night talking, laughing, and flirting with 
each other.  As Kate and her friend, Laura, were leaving the party Jason asked 
Kate for her number and if she wanted to go out with him.  Kate readily agreed.  
The next weekend, Kate and Jason had dinner together and later went to Jason’s 
apartment to watch a movie.  As they watched the movie they started kissing.  
When Jason started undressing Kate, she said she was uncomfortable and that she 
wanted him to stop.  Jason did not stop, however.  Although Kate resisted, Jason 
continued undressing her, held her down and had sexual intercourse with Kate.  
Afterwards, Kate decided that it was important [to tell no one about this incident] 
[to tell her friend, Laura, about this incident] [to report this incident to the police 
and press charges against Jason]. 
 
Measure of victim and perpetrator blame.  Participants completed an 11-item 
measure of victim and perpetrator blame adapted from Abrams et al. (2003).  See 
Appendix C.  Participants indicated their responses using a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all, 5 
= Somewhat, 9 = Completely or Totally).  For the two items in which participants had to 
assign blame or sympathy, participants used a different 9-point scale (1 = Jason, 5 = Kate 
& Jason equally; 9 = Kate).  Four items were reverse-scored and the mean was 
calculated.  Higher scores indicated more victim-blaming.  Abrams et al. reported a 
coefficient alpha of .75.  The coefficient alpha for this sample was .82.  Scores were 
positively skewed (Skew = 1.59, SE Skew = .13) and were log-transformed. 
Rape myth acceptance. Participants completed the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance 
Scale (IRMA-SF; Payne et al., 1999). This scale contained 20 items and had a 9-point 
Likert scale (1 = Not at all agree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 9 = Very much agree) to assess 
agreement with myths about women as victims of rape, male perpetrators, and rape as a 
violent crime (e.g., “A lot of women lead a man on and then they cry rape.”).  See 
Appendix D.  The total score was calculated by computing the mean. Higher scores 
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signified more agreement with rape myths.  Payne et al. reported a coefficient alpha of 
.93.  The coefficient alpha for this study was .88.  Scores were positively skewed (Skew = 
.88, Skew SE = .13) and were log-transformed. 
Measure of Gender-Specific System Justification. Participants’ completed Jost and 
Kay’s (2005) measure of gender-specific system justification.  This measure assessed 
people’s attitudes toward the current state of sex-role division in the United States (“In 
general, relations between men and women are fair in the United States.”).  See Appendix 
E.  Kay and Jost reported a coefficient alpha of .65.  Because their coefficient alpha was 
lower than desired, four items were added from Schmader, Major, Eccleston, and 
McCoy’s (2001) measure that assessed the perceived legitimacy of status difference 
between men and women in United States (“America is an open society in which both 
men and women can achieve higher status.”).  Schmader et al. reported a coefficient 
alpha of .72.   Participants were asked to indicate the strength of agreement using a 9-
point scale (1 = Not at all agree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 9 = Very much agree).  An overall 
score was calculated using the mean.  The coefficient alpha was .86.         
Scenario manipulation checks. Participants were asked a series of questions to 
determine if they read the date-rape scenario and if the threat manipulation within the 
scenarios worked.  To check the manipulation of status, participants indicated where Kate 
and Jason went to school.  To check the manipulation of threat, participants were asked 
who Kate decided that it was important to tell about the incident (no one, her friend, her 
parents, a school counselor, the police).  Participants also indicated how much Kate’s 
decision would negatively affect Jason (1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = Very much).  
See Appendix F.   
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Manipulation check.  Seventy-three participants (19.7% of the sample) incorrectly 
remembered where Kate or Jason went to school or whom Kate told.  Of these 73 
participants, significantly more participants who completed the survey online 
misremembered the story (61.6%, n = 45) compared to the college students who 
completed the survey in person (χ2(1) = 9.34, p < .01).  There was no gender difference in 
the sub-sample of participants who misremembered the story (χ2(1) = 0.07, p > .10).  
Participants who misremembered the story were excluded from the main analyses leaving 
297 participants.   
Differences between the Online Sample and the University Sample.  A MANOVA 
was conducted to determine if the university sample and online sample differed on any of 
variable means.  Means and standard deviations (untransformed) are presented in Table 2.  
The overall MANOVA was not significant (F(5, 290) = 0.48, p = .79) indicating that 
were no significant differences between the university and online samples on these 
variables.  
Threat manipulation.  To determine if the threat manipulation worked, a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted to determine if participants reported differences in how Kate’s 
decision about who to tell would negatively affect Jason.  There was a main effect of 
threat (F(2, 279) = 107.92, p < .001, η2 = .44).  Participants who read that Kate was going  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables for the University (n = 173) and 
Online Samples (n = 123) 
 
          
 
Variable    University       Online                    
System Justification   3.13 (1.37)   3.04 (1.40)   
Social Dominance   2.84 (1.37)   2.92 (1.48)   
Victim Blame     1.92 (0.74)   2.02 (1.06) 
RMA     2.32 (0.85)   2.41 (1.10) 
GSJ      5.17 (0.78)   5.12 (0.79) 
___________________________      
Note. RMA = Rape Myth Acceptance, GSJ = Gender-specific System Justification.   
Judgments were made on a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all, 9 = Completely).  The  
values in parentheses are standard deviations.   
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to tell no one reported that her actions would affect Jason significantly less (M = 2.79) 
than did participants who read that Kate was going to tell a mutual friend (M = 5.86, p < 
.001); those who read that Kate was going to tell a mutual friend thought that her actions 
would affect Jason significantly less than did participants who read that Kate was going 
to report Jason to the police (M = 8.03, ps < .001).  There were no other significant main 
effects or interactions.  This finding indicates that the threat manipulation worked.   
System Justification Orientation and Social Dominance Orientation Scores across 
Conditions.  To determine if participants’ System Justification Orientation and Social 
Dominance Orientation scores were equal across conditions, a 9 (condition) x 2 
(participant gender) MANOVA was conducted.  Means and standard deviations are 
reported in Table 3.  The main effect of Condition was not significant (F(16, 554) = 1.27, 
p = .21) and the interaction between participant gender and condition was not significant 
(F(16, 554) = 1.09, p = .36).   
There was a main effect of gender for System Justification Orientation (F(1, 279) 
= 9.34, p = .002, η2 = .03) such that men reported higher levels of System Justification 
Orientation (Mln = 1.13) than did women (Mln = .95).  The main effect of gender for 
Social Dominance Orientation was marginally significant (F(1, 279) = 3.34, p = .07) such 
that men reported marginally higher Social Dominance Orientation (Mln = 1.00) than did 
women (Mln = .88).  Both men and women reported significantly higher levels of System 
Justification Orientation than Social Dominance Orientation (men: t(116) = -3.02, p = 
.003; women: t(179) = -2.04, p = .04).   
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TABLE 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ System Justification Orientation and 
Social Dominance Orientation by Condition for Women (n = 180) and Men (n = 117). 
 
             
 
Condition           SJO(ln)    SDO(ln)  n  
Victim Lower  Tells No one Women      .84 (.38)   .99 (.45) 20  
Men  1.05 (.32)   .85 (.50) 11 
Tells Friend Women 1.08 (.39)   .93 (.41) 22 
Men  1.36 (.34) 1.14 (.46) 18 
Tells Police Women   .92 (.49)   .75 (.65) 18 
Men    .98 (.46)   .67 (.62)   9 
Victim Equal  Tells No one Women   .94 (.50)   .90 (.48) 21 
   Men  1.14 (.51)   .97 (.50) 16 
Tells Friend    Women   .98 (.47)   .88 (.47) 18 
Men  1.24 (.45) 1.06 (.33) 13 
Tells Police  Women 1.02 (.52) 1.03 (.56) 23  
Men  1.09 (.36)   .95 (.48)   6 
Victim Higher  Tells No one Women   .90 (.47)   .70 (.67) 14 
     Men  1.33 (.39) 1.20 (.48) 12 
   Tells Friend Women   .86 (.56)   .61 (.56) 22 
     Men  1.01 (.48) 1.02 (.54) 16 
   Tells Police  Women 1.00 (.44) 1.01 (.51) 22 
     Men    .89 (.59)   .99 (.44) 16 
             
Note. SJO(ln) = System Justification Orientation (log), SDO(ln) = Social Dominance Orientation (log).   
Judgments were made on a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all, 9 = Completely).  Values in parentheses are 
standard deviations.   
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Intercorrelations between Variables   
Pearson correlations among the predictors are presented in Table 4.  Men’s (r = 
.53, p < .001) and women’s (r = .52, p < .001) correlations between Social Dominance 
Orientation and System Justification Orientation were robust.  Most of the correlations 
between System Justification Orientation, Social Dominance Orientation, Victim Blame, 
Rape Myth Acceptance, and gender-specific system justification were positive (Glick & 
Fiske, 1996; Pratto et al., 1994).   
Multivariate Assumptions   
Scatterplots between System Justification Orientation, Social Dominance 
Orientation, victim blame, rape myth acceptance, and gender-specific system justification 
were linear.  Multicollinearity was checked using multiple regression; tolerance levels 
were at acceptable levels (.60 and above) for the additive model (Step 1) but were below 
.60 for the hierarchical interaction models (Steps 2, 3, and 4).  Two participants were 
identified as high leverage (Cook’s > .20; Leverage > .55) and were omitted from 
analyses, leaving 295 participants.   
Using System Justification Orientation to Predict Rape Myth Acceptance, Victim Blame, 
and Gender-Specific System Justification 
 
Three hierarchical multiple regressions computed the effect of participants’ 
System Justification Orientation score on participants’ (1) rape myth acceptance, (2) 
victim blame, and (3) gender-specific system justification.  Predictor variables were 
participants’ System Justification Orientation score, participant gender, Kate’s status  
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TABLE 4 
 
 
Intercorrelations between Variables for Women (above the diagonal, n = 180)  
and Men (below the diagonal, n =115). 
 
 
 
Subscale SJO SDO Blame RMA GSJ 
SJO  ― .52*** .17* .19*      .12 
SDO     .53***      ―   .31***   .46***    .32*** 
Blame   .27** .31*** ―   .56*** .14† 
RMA .17† .34***   .53***  ―   .23** 
GSJ   .25**    .19*      .20*   .34***  ― 
      
Note. SJO = System Justification Orientation, SDO = Social Dominance Orientation,  
Blame = Victim blame, RMA = Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale, GSJ = Gender-specific  
system justification.  
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.   
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relative to Jason’s, and the level of threat Kate posed to Jason.  In Step 1, System 
Justification Orientation, participant gender, level of threat, and victim’s relative status 
were entered.  In Step 2, all possible two-way interactions were entered.  In Step 3, all 
possible three-way interactions were entered and, in Step 4, all possible four-way 
interactions were entered.  Continuous and categorical variables were coded to test the 
hypotheses (West, Aiken, & Krull, 1996).  System Justification Orientation scores were 
centered and participant gender was contrast coded (-1 = female; +1 = male).  For Kate’s 
relative status, dummy variables were created for Equal (i.e., Kate and Jason are equal 
status) and Higher (i.e., Kate is higher status than Jason) so that the comparison group 
was Lower (i.e., Kate is lower status than Jason).  For threat to Jason, dummy variables 
were created for Friend (i.e., Kate tells a mutual friend about Jason raping her) and Police 
(i.e., Kate reports Jason to the police) so that the comparison group was No one (i.e., Kate 
tells no one).    
It was predicted that high-System Justification Orientation participants would 
report higher rape myth acceptance, victim blame, and gender-specific system 
justification when lower-status Kate decided to report higher-status Jason to the police.  
Thus, the System Justification Orientation x Lower x Police interaction should be a 
significant predictor (i.e., Step 3 or 4 in the multiple regression).  All simple slope 
analyses were computed on a web-based calculator (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006).  
  Predicting Rape Myth Acceptance.  Using System Justification Orientation to 
predict rape myth acceptance, Step 1 with main effects only was significant and 
accounted for 8.0% of the variance in rape myth acceptance (F(6, 284) = 4.09, p = .001).  
On average men reported higher levels of rape myth acceptance than did women (β = .18, 
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t = 3.16, p = .002).  System Justification Orientation was positively associated with rape 
myth acceptance (β = .16, t = 2.81, p = .005).  Victim’s relative status or the threat she 
posed to the perpetrator did not predict rape myth acceptance (ps > .10). 
Step 2 did not add a significant amount of variance to this model and none of the 
two-way interaction terms were significant (ps > .10).  Step 3, however, added 6.6% of 
the variance to the model (p = .06) and, including Steps 1 and 2, accounted for 17.1% of 
the variance in rape myth acceptance (F(31, 263) = 1.75, p = .01; see Table 5).  Step 4 
did not add a significant amount of variance to this model and none of the four-way 
interaction terms were significant (ps > .10).   
In Step 3, the System Justification Orientation x Lower x Police interaction was 
significant (β = .22, t = 2.30, p = .02) and the System Justification Orientation x Lower x 
No one interaction was marginally significant (β = -.55, t = -1.78, p = .08; see Figure 1).  
Consistent with prediction, analysis of the simple slopes showed that high-System 
Justification Orientation participants reported lower rape myth acceptance when lower-
status Kate decided to tell no one than when she decided to report higher-status Jason to 
the police (B = .37, t = 1.97, p = .05).  By comparison, low-System Justification 
Orientation participants’ rape myth acceptance was not significantly affected when 
lower-status Kate reported higher-status Jason to the police compared to when she told no 
one (B = -.28, t = -1.62, p = .11).4   
The System Justification Orientation x Equal x Police interaction was significant 
(β = -.30, t = -2.22, p = .03).  Simple slope analysis again showed that high-System 
Justification Orientation participants reported lower rape myth acceptance when lower-  
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TABLE 5 
Multiple Regression Predicting Participants’ Rape Myth Acceptance Based on  
Participants’ System Justification Orientation Level (n = 295).   
 
            
    
Predictor         B        SE B     β                     
Step 1      R2 = .08*** 
     Participant gender     .08         .02   .19** 
     SJO      .14         .05   .16* 
Step 2      ∆R2 = .02 
Step 3      ∆R2 = .07† 
    Mean SJO x Lower x No one (Intercept)  .81         .08 
    Mean SJO x Gender x Lower x No one  .15         .08   .36† 
    SJO x Lower x No one                         -.47         .26            -.55†  
    SJO x Lower x Police              .70         .30   .47*  
    SJO x Equal x No one    .67         .29   .45* 
    SJO x Higher x No one    .59         .31   .43† 
    SJO x Equal x Friend                -.76         .37            -.27* 
    SJO x Equal x Police                   -.79         .36            -.30* 
    SJO x Higher x Police                 -.89          .37            -.40* 
Step 4     ∆R2  = .005          
            
Note.  SJO = System Justification Orientation.  For Step 3, the comparison group is the intercept  
which is (averaging across male and female participants) mean-level SJO, and lower-status victim  
telling no one about the perpetrator raping her.   
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.  
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FIGURE 1 
 
 
Participants’ Rape Myth Acceptance when Lower-Status Victim Decides to Tell No one 
Versus Report Perpetrator to the Police Moderated by Participants’ System Justification 
Orientation.  
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Note. System Justification Orientation x Lower x Police (β = .22, t = 2.30, p = .02).   
Simple slope for strong System Justification Orientation (+1SD: B = .37, t = 1.97, p = .05).  
Simple slope for weak System Justification Orientation (-1SD: B = -.28, t = -1.62, p = .11). 
 
Lower-Status Victim 
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status Kate decided to tell no one than when she decided to report higher-status Jason to 
the police.  By comparison, participants’ System Justification Orientation level was  
unrelated to their rape myth acceptance when equal-status Kate decided to tell no one 
compared to when she decided to report Jason to the police (ps > .10).   
The System Justification Orientation x Higher x Police interaction was significant 
(β = -.40, t = -2.42, p = .02).  Simple slope analysis again showed that high-System 
Justification Orientation participants reported lower rape myth acceptance when lower-
status Kate decided to tell no one than when she decided to report higher-status Jason to 
the police.  By comparison, participants’ System Justification Orientation level was 
unrelated to their rape myth acceptance when higher-status Kate decided to tell no one 
compared to when she decided to report lower-status Jason to the police (ps > .10).   
The System Justification Orientation x Equal x Friend interaction was also 
significant (β = -.27, t = -2.06, p = .04).  Simple slope analysis found that participants’ 
System Justification Orientation level was unrelated to their rape myth acceptance when 
equal-status Kate decided to tell no one compared to when she told a mutual friend (ps > 
.10).  Although high-System Justification Orientation participants reported lower rape 
myth acceptance when lower-status Kate decided tell no one than when she decided to 
tell a mutual friend, this slope was not significant (p = .12). 
The gender x Lower x No one interaction was marginally significant (β = .36, t = 
1.79, p = .08).  Men reported marginally higher rape myth acceptance than did women 
when lower-status Kate told no one about higher-status Jason raping her. 
Predicting Victim Blame.  Using System Justification Orientation to predict 
victim blame, the overall model including only main effects was significant and 
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accounted for 4.9% of the variance in victim blame (F(6, 288) = 2.48, p = .02).  System 
Justification Orientation was positively associated with victim blame (β = .19, t = 3.24, p 
= .001).  There was no difference between male and female participants (p > .10).  Step 2 
added 5.7% of the variance to the model and this increase was marginally significant (p = 
.07).  This model, including Step 1, accounted for 11.8% of the variance in victim blame 
(F(13, 275) = 1.94, p = .01; see Table 6).  Against prediction, neither Step 3 nor Step 4 
added a significant amount of variance to this model and none of the interaction terms in 
these steps were significant (ps > .10).   
In Step 2, the Lower x Police interaction was significant (β = -.22, t = -2.14, p = 
.03).  Averaging across System Justification Orientation-level, participants blamed lower-
status Kate more when she told no one about higher-status Jason raping her than when 
she reported him to the police.   
The Equal x Friend interaction was significant (β = .33, t = 3.15, p = .002).  
Averaging across participants’ System Justification Orientation level, participants 
reported higher victim blame when lower-status Kate told no one about higher-status 
Jason raping her than when she told a mutual friend (B = -.25, t = -2.54, p = .01).  By 
comparison, participants reported the same level of victim blame when equal-status Kate 
told no one about Jason raping her or told her friend (B = .18, t = 1.67, p = .10).   
The Higher x Friend interaction was also significant (β = .24, t = 2.03, p = .04).  
As stated above, participants blamed lower-status Kate more when she told no one than 
when she told a friend.  By comparison, participants reported the same level of victim 
blame when higher-status Kate told no one about lower-status Jason raping her than when 
she told a mutual friend (B = .03, t = 0.30, p > .10).   
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TABLE 6 
Multiple Regression Predicting Participants’ Victim Blame Based on Participants’  
System Justification Orientation Level (n = 295)   
 
            
 
Predictor               B        SE B   β                     
Step 1      R2 = .05* 
     SJO        .16         .05   .19** 
Step 2      ∆R2 = .07† 
     Mean SJO x Lower x No one (Intercept)      .76         .07 
     Mean SJO x Lower x Friend      -.25         .10 -.31** 
     Mean SJO x Lower x Police                     -.22         .10 -.26* 
     Mean SJO x Equal x No one                 -.20         .10 -.24* 
     Mean SJO x Equal x Friend           .43         .14  .33**  
     Mean SJO x Higher x Friend     .28         .14  .24* 
     SJO x Higher      .25         .13  .19† 
Step 3      ∆R2 = .03 
Step 4      ∆R2 = .01 
            
Note.  SJO = System Justification Orientation.  For Step 2, the comparison group is the intercept  
which is lower-status victim, telling no one about the perpetrator raping her, averaging across  
SJO-level and participant gender.   
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .001. 
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The System Justification Orientation x Higher interaction was marginally significant (β = 
.25, t = 1.94, p = .05).  Simple slope analysis showed that low-System Justification 
Orientation participants blamed the victim more when she was lower status than the 
perpetrator than when she was higher status (B = -.28, t = -2.31, p = .02).  High-System 
Justification Orientation participants reported the same amount of victim blame no matter 
if the victim was lower or higher status (B = -.04, t = -.037, p > .10).   
Predicting Gender-Specific System Justification. Using System Justification 
Orientation to predict gender-specific system justification, Step 1 including only main 
effects was significant and accounted for 4.8% of the variance in gender-specific system 
justification (F(6, 287) = 2.42, p = .03).  System Justification Orientation was positively 
associated with gender-specific system justification (β = .15, t = 2.58, p = .01).  Men 
reported marginally higher gender-specific system justification than did women (β = .10, 
t = 1.68, p = .09).  The relative status of the victim or the amount of threat she posed to 
the perpetrator in the date-rape scenario did not directly affect participants’ gender-
specific system justification.  Steps 2, 3, and 4 with the interaction terms did not add a 
significant amount of variance to this model (ps > .10): all possible 2-way, 3-way, and 4-
way interactions were tested and none was significant.  Against prediction, participants 
did not report higher gender-specific system justification when the lower-status victim 
decided to report the perpetrator to the police.   
Using Social Dominance Orientation to Predict Rape Myth Acceptance, Victim Blame, 
and Gender-Specific System Justification 
  
I hypothesized that the pattern of results for rape myth acceptance, victim blame, 
and gender-specific system justification would be different for System Justification 
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Orientation and Social Dominance Orientation.  Because Social Dominance Orientation 
measures ingroup dominance, I hypothesized that men with a strong social dominance 
orientation would espouse more rape myths, victim blame, and gender-specific system 
justification regardless of relative status of the victim and the degree of threat she posed 
to the perpetrator compared to women with a strong social dominance orientation (i.e., 
Social Dominance Orientation x gender).       
Three hierarchical multiple regressions computed participants’ (1) rape myth 
acceptance, (2) victim blame, and (3) gender-specific system justification.  In Step 1, 
participants’ Social Dominance Orientation score, participant gender, victim’s relative 
status, and the level of threat she posed to the perpetrator were entered.  In Step 2, all 
possible two-way interactions were entered.  In Step 3, all possible three-way interactions 
were entered and, in Step 4, all possible four-way interactions were entered.  Social 
Dominance Orientation scores were centered and participant gender was contrast coded (-
1 = female; +1 = male).  Kate’s relative status and threat to Jason were dummy-coded as 
in previous analyses.  Again, the comparison group was Lower (i.e., Kate is lower status 
than Jason) and No one (i.e., Kate tells no one).    
 Predicting Rape Myth Acceptance.  Using Social Dominance Orientation to 
predict rape myth acceptance, Step 1 with main effects only was significant and 
accounted for 21.2% of the variance in rape myth acceptance (F(6, 288) = 12.94, p < 
.001).  On average, men reported higher levels of rape myth acceptance than did women 
(β = .17, t = 3.25, p = .001).  Social Dominance Orientation was positively associated 
with rape myth acceptance (β = .40, t = 7.54, p < .001).  Steps 2, 3, and 4 with the 
interaction terms did not add a significant amount of variance to this model (p > .10) and 
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none of the interactions were significant (ps > .10).  Against prediction, the Social 
Dominance Orientation x gender interaction was not significant. 
Predicting Victim Blame. Using Social Dominance Orientation to predict victim 
blame, the Step 1 including only main effects was significant and accounted for 10.0% of 
the variance in victim blame (F(6, 288) = 5.33, p < .001).  Social Dominance Orientation 
was positively associated with victim blame (β = .30, t = 5.23, p < .001).  There was no 
difference between male and female participants (p > .10).  The relative status of the 
victim or the amount of threat she posed to the perpetrator in the date-rape scenario did 
not directly affect participants’ victim-blaming attitudes.   
Step 2 added 6.5% of the variance to the model and this increase was marginally 
significant (p = .07).  This model, including Step 1, accounted for 16.5% of the variance 
in victim blame (F(13, 275) = 2.86, p < .001; see Table 7).  Neither Step 3 nor Step 4 
added a significant amount of variance to this model and none of the interaction terms in 
these steps were significant (ps > .10).   
Against prediction, the Social Dominance Orientation x gender interaction was 
not significant.   The Lower x Police interaction was marginally significant (β = -.20, t =  
-1.88, p = .06).  Participants reported marginally higher victim blame when lower-status 
Kate more when she told no one about higher-status Jason raping her than when she 
reported him to the police.   
The Equal x Friend interaction was significant (β = .44, t = 3.38, p = .001).  
Averaging across participants’ Social Dominance Orientation level, participants reported 
higher victim blame when lower-status Kate told no one about higher-status Jason raping 
her than when she told a mutual friend (B = -.27, t = -2.81, p = .005).  By comparison,  
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TABLE 7 
 
 
Multiple Regression Predicting Participants’ Victim Blame Based on Participants’  
Social Dominance Orientation Level (n = 295)   
 
            
 
Predictor               B        SE B   β                     
Step 1      R2 = .08** 
     SDO        .23         .04 .30**  
Step 2      ∆R2 = .06† 
     Mean SDO x Lower x No one (Intercept)      .76         .07 
     Mean SDO x Lower x Friend              -.27         .09 -.32** 
     Mean SDO x Lower x Police              -.20         .10 -.23† 
     Mean SDO x Equal x No one               -.20         .09 -.24* 
     Mean SDO x Equal x Friend              .44         .13  .33**  
     Mean SDO x Higher x Friend     .30         .13  .26* 
     SDO x Higher       .18         .10  .15† 
Step 3      ∆R2 = .04 
Step 4      ∆R2 = .02 
            
Note.  SDO = Social Dominance Orientation.  For Step 2, the comparison group is the intercept  
which is lower-status victim, telling no one about the perpetrator raping her, averaging across  
SDO-level and participant gender.   
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .001. 
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participants reported the same level of victim blame when equal-status Kate told no one 
about Jason raping her or told her friend (B = .17, t = 1.38, p > .10).   
The Higher x Friend interaction was also significant (β = .30, t = 2.26, p = .02).  
As stated above, participants blamed lower-status Kate more when she told no one than 
when she told a friend.  By comparison, participants reported the same level of victim 
blame when higher-status Kate told no one about lower-status Jason raping her than when 
she told a mutual friend (B = .04, t = 0.28, p > .10).   
The Social Dominance Orientation x Higher interaction was marginally 
significant (β = .18, t = 1.72, p = .09).  Simple slope analysis showed that low-Social 
Dominance Orientation participants blamed the victim more when she was lower status 
than the perpetrator than when she was higher status (B = -.24, t = -2.16, p = .03).  High-
Social Dominance Orientation participants reported the same amount of victim blame no 
matter if the victim was lower or higher status (B = -.07, t = -0.06, p > .10).   
Predicting Gender-Specific System Justification. Using Social Dominance 
Orientation to predict gender-specific system justification, Step 1 including only main 
effects was significant and accounted for 9.7% of the variance in gender-specific system 
justification (F(6, 287) = 5.15, p < .001).  Social Dominance Orientation was positively 
associated with gender-specific system justification (β = .27, t = 4.76, p < .001).  There 
was no difference between male and female participants (p = .10).  The relative status of 
the victim or the amount of threat she posed to the perpetrator in the date-rape scenario 
did not directly affect participants’ gender-specific system justification.  Steps 2, 3, and 4 
did not add a significant amount of variance to this model (p > .10) and none of the 
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interaction terms were significant (ps > .10).   Against prediction, the Social Dominance 
Orientation x gender interaction was not significant. 
Discussion  
 The goal of this study was to determine what factors influence people’s rape myth 
acceptance.  Specifically, this study determined how rape myth acceptance is affected by 
individual factors, such as people’s gender and their system justification orientation, as 
well as situational factors, such as the victim’s status relative to the perpetrator and the 
threat posed to the perpetrator by the victim’s rape allegation.  In addition to predicting 
rape myth acceptance, I was also interested in determining how these individual and 
situational factors would predict how much people blamed the victim and believed that 
women and men have equal opportunities in the U.S (i.e., gender-specific system 
justification).  Further, as a comparison to system justification orientation, I examined if 
people’s social dominance orientation-level also influenced rape myth acceptance, victim 
blame, and gender-specific system justification. 
 Based on system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), I expected that rape 
myth acceptance would increase for people with a strong system justification orientation 
in the situation where a low-status victim threatened to press charges against a high-status 
perpetrator.  Controlling for situational factors and people’s system justification 
orientation, men reported higher rape myth acceptance than did women.  This suggests 
that people’s system justification orientation (i.e., acceptance of the status quo) did not 
account for gender differences in rape myth acceptance.  It could be that men identified 
more with the male perpetrator, but this seems unlikely: previous research has shown 
that, compared to women, men report higher rape myth acceptance regardless of the 
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perpetrator’s or victim’s gender (Chapleau et al., 2008).  Rather, men may report higher 
rape myth acceptance because they focus more on the sexual aspect of rape.  Chapleau 
and Oswald (2010) found that men explicitly associate consensual sex with power to a 
greater degree than do women and that an explicit power-sex association positively 
correlates with men’s rape myth acceptance.  If men on average are more likely to believe 
the “sex myth” that consensual sex typically involves dominating a sexual partner, then 
they may also be more likely to believe rape myths (e.g., women enjoy being forced to 
have sex), particularly in cases of date rape where consensual sex is a possible outcome 
of a date.  Thus, the gender difference in rape myth acceptance may be due to men’s 
sexual socialization, higher testosterone levels (see Carney & Mason, 2010), or a 
confluence of the two.   
 Controlling for participants’ gender, people with a stronger system justification 
orientation reported higher rape myth acceptance than did people with a weaker system 
justification orientation.  People with a strong system justification orientation are more 
accepting of group hierarchy and the status quo, regardless of whether they are at the top 
or the bottom of the hierarchy (Jost & Thompson, 2000).  People who accept the status 
quo may be more likely to believe that women perpetrate their own rapes because, if they 
acknowledge that rape is a social problem, then they must acknowledge that something is 
wrong with the status quo.   
 Although people with a strong system justification orientation reported higher 
rape myth acceptance overall, their rape myth acceptance-level was influenced by the 
situation.  Participants with a strong system justification orientation who read that a low-
status victim would tell no one and allow the high-status perpetrator to go unpunished 
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reported lower rape myth acceptance than when that victim decided to press charges 
against him.  All participants in this study reported a low rape myth acceptance-level 
suggesting that people still believe some rape myths to a small degree.  It is interesting, 
then, that people with a strong system justification orientation endorsed rape myths to an 
even lesser degree when the low-status victim decided to tell no one.  Because strong-
system justification people would be sensitive to the usurping of the status quo, it follows 
that when the low-status victim chose to not seek justice there would be less of a need to 
endorse rape myths.  This suggests that, for people with a strong system justification 
orientation, rape myths serve as a legitimizing ideology and that low rape myth 
acceptance is the reward (or lack of punishment) for the low-status victim who knows her 
place.   
 It is important to note that this effect occurred in the participants’ own minds – 
they were not called to use rape myths to sway other people’s opinions.  This shows that 
rape myth acceptance is malleable and that it can shift depending on the relative status of 
the characters and the threat posed to the perpetrator.  This finding refutes our 
understanding of rape myth acceptance as a stable trait.  Recent research has started 
examining the stability of people’s attitudes (Garcia-Marques, Santos, & Mackie, 2006) 
and how people use ideologies to support the social hierarchy (Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, 
& Chow, 2009).  The findings in this study are consistent with this research.  Like other 
stereotypes and ideologies, rape myth acceptance is dynamic and may be employed to 
satisfy socially-motivated goals such as maintaining the status quo.   
 System justification theory was partially supported given that the findings were 
specific to people with a strong system justification orientation.  The findings, however, 
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were inconsistent with system justification theory because previous research has shown 
that everyone (regardless of system justification orientation-level) legitimizes the system 
more when the system is under threat (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).  This discrepancy may 
be due to how system threat was operationalized.  In this study system threat was 
operationalized as a single rape victim threatening to report her attacker to the police.  In 
comparison, Jost, Glaser, and colleagues operationalized system threat as waning national 
security and pride.  Thus, a single rape victim reporting a rapist to the police may not 
have been a big enough threat to provoke all people to defend the high-status perpetrator.  
Future studies could examine if system threat on a national scale relates to people’s rape 
myth acceptance.   
 Furthermore, one question is why was there was no difference in rape myth 
acceptance when the high-status victim pressed charges against the low-status perpetrator 
versus when she chose to tell no one?  The malleability of rape myth acceptance may be 
based on the specific situation where the victim is lower status than the perpetrator, based 
on the victim’s low status (regardless of the perpetrator’s status), or based on the 
perpetrator’s high status (regardless of the victim’s status).  Future work manipulating 
other combinations of the victim and perpetrator’s status (e.g., low-status perpetrator 
rapes low-status victim) would shed light on this issue.  
 It is also possible that the high-status victim in the date-rape scenario “lowered 
herself” by agreeing to date a lower-status male and by being victimized by him.  Thus, 
people with a strong system justification orientation may report lower rape myth 
acceptance when a high-status woman is a raped by a low-status stranger and she decides 
to press charges.  This is also an area for future research.     
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This study also examined how individual and situational factors would influence 
people’s willingness to blame the victim.  I expected the same finding for victim blame 
that had been found for rape myth acceptance: people with a strong system justification 
orientation would blame the victim more when the low-status victim threatened to report 
the perpetrator to the police compared to when she told no one.  This hypothesis, 
however, was not supported.  Like rape myth acceptance, men and women with a strong 
system justification orientation reported marginally higher victim blame averaging across 
the situation factors.  That is, people who were motivated to accept the status quo were 
also motivated to state that Kate was at least partially responsible for Jason raping her.  
Again, if people with a strong system justification orientation acknowledged that Jason 
was wholly responsible for raping Kate, then they may have to acknowledge that violence 
and injustice exist, and that the status quo is flawed.  If there is distress associated with 
this knowledge (Jost & Hunyady, 2005), holding the victim partially responsible could 
mitigate the distress. 
Unlike the results found for rape myth acceptance, victim blame was predicted by 
an unexpected interaction between people’s system justification orientation-level and the 
victim’s relative status, controlling for the threat the victim posed to the perpetrator (i.e., 
what she decided to do after the rape).  Although people with a weak system justification 
orientation on average blamed Kate less than did strong system justification orientation-
people, weak system justification orientation-people blamed Kate more when she was 
lower status than Jason.  People with a weak system justification orientation are less 
accepting of the status quo and believe that steps should be taken to equalize groups.  It 
follows that they would be more likely to acknowledge that rape is a social problem and 
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would want a rape victim to seek justice.  However, this finding indicates that even 
people with a weak system justification orientation are somewhat biased against a low-
status victim no matter if she reports the high-status perpetrator to the police, tells her 
friend, or keeps silent.   
Furthermore, people (regardless of system justification orientation level) blamed 
the low-status victim more (not less) when she decided to tell no one compared to when 
she decided to report the high-status perpetrator to the police or to tell her friend.  This 
finding was only true when the victim was low-status: people reported the same level of 
victim blame toward the equal-status and high-status victim regardless of whether she 
told no one, her friend, or the police.  Participants may have tried to divine why the low-
status Kate chose not to tell anyone about high-status Jason raping her.  One reason Kate 
would tell no one is if she blamed herself for the rape.  Specifically, by deciding that it 
was important to tell no one, participants may have thought that low-status Kate was 
admitting some culpability.  Thus, participants’ higher victim blaming would indicate 
that they (wrongly) agreed with low-status Kate’s perception of events.  Participants 
“agreed” less (i.e., less victim blame) when Kate was equal- or higher-status than Jason.  
This finding is disturbing because it indicates that people would be less likely to 
discourage a rape victim from keeping silent if she was lower-status than the perpetrator.     
Comparing the pattern of results that predict rape myth acceptance and victim 
blame suggests that rape myth acceptance and victim blame are influenced by different 
factors.  One reason different factors predicted rape myth acceptance and victim blame is 
that rape myths are stereotypes about female victims and male perpetrators in general, 
whereas victim blame is specific to a particular victim and perpetrator.  Because rape 
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myth acceptance was influenced by people’s acceptance of the status quo combined with 
the low-status victim’s willingness to maintain the status quo, this indicates that rape 
myth acceptance is an ideology that people use to legitimize injustice as “the way things 
are.”   
In contrast victim blame is not an ideology, but it may be an application of 
ideological beliefs.  In this study, participants completed the victim blame measure first 
and the rape myth acceptance scale second.  The order of measures may have produced 
different patterns of results for victim blame and rape myth acceptance.  Bohner et al. 
(1998, 2005) found that the correlation between men’s rape proclivity and rape myth 
acceptance was higher when male participants completed the rape myth acceptance scale 
first and the rape proclivity measure second.  Bohner and colleagues concluded that men 
use rape myths to lower their inhibitions to rape as opposed to using rape myths to justify 
their aggressive behavior after the fact.  Although not tested, Bohner et al.’s finding may 
apply to people’s victim blaming.  Perhaps if people completed the rape myth acceptance 
measure first and victim blame measure second, then the same factors that predicted rape 
myth acceptance would have predicted victim blame.  That is, people with a strong 
system justification orientation would have blamed the low-status victim less when she 
chose to keep silent than when she reported the high-status perpetrator to the police.  This 
would be interesting to determine in future studies.  Regardless, this study suggests that, 
although rape myth acceptance and victim blame are positively correlated and seem to 
measure similar attitudes, they are not interchangeable.  Researchers who study people’s 
attitudes about rape should be careful when deciding between these measures or they 
should consider including both. 
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This study also examined the effect of individual and situational factors on 
people’s gender-specific system justification.  People with a strong system justification 
orientation were more likely to justify life in the United States as fair for men and 
women.  As with rape myth acceptance, I hypothesized that people with a strong system 
justification orientation would report higher gender-specific system justification when a 
lower-status victim threatened to report the perpetrator to the police.  This hypothesis was 
not supported.  This may be because, although gender-specific system justification is a 
legitimizing ideology, it does not legitimize rape or violence.  Kay and Jost (2005) found 
that gender-specific system justification increased when people were presented with 
sexist stereotypes about men’s and women’s traits and managerial styles.  The connection 
between equal opportunities for success in the United States and stereotypes about men’s 
and women’s abilities is obvious.  The connection between equal opportunities for 
success and rape, however, is less so.  Thus, whereas evidence of sexism in the 
workplace would likely provoke people to defend the system by espousing that men and 
women have equal opportunities (i.e., gender-specific system justification), evidence of 
rape and threat to the system would provoke people to defend the system by espousing 
that rape is not a problem—that is, rape myth acceptance.  This suggests that people use 
legitimizing ideologies that are specific to the situation.   
 As a comparison to participants’ system justification orientation, participants’ 
social dominance orientation (i.e., belief that one’s group should dominate other groups) 
was also used to predict rape myth acceptance, victim blame, and gender-specific system 
justification.  Because men have a stronger social dominance orientation than do women 
(Pratto et al., 1994), I expected that social dominance orientation would interact with 
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gender to predict the three dependent variables.  Unlike system justification orientation, I 
expected that an interaction between social dominance orientation and the situational 
factors (i.e., victim’s relative status and threat to perpetrator) would not predict the 
dependent variables.  This hypothesis was partially supported.   
 Predicting rape myth acceptance, both gender and social dominance orientation 
were independent predictors: men reported higher rape myth acceptance and people with 
a stronger social dominance orientation reported higher rape myth acceptance.  With 
social dominance orientation in the model, people’s rape myth acceptance was not 
influenced by the victim’s relative status or threat posed to the perpetrator.  This may be 
because social dominance and system justification are different constructs.  Whereas 
system justification is the acceptance of inequality, social dominance is the belief that 
one’s group should forcefully dominate other groups (Jost & Burgess, 2000).  Because 
people with a strong social dominance orientation are more accepting of the use of 
aggression to maintain their dominance, they may also be more likely to legitimize 
interpersonal violence such as rape (Pratto et al., 1994) regardless of the victim’s status or 
the threat she poses to the perpetrator.   
 A more important distinction between social dominance and system justification 
orientations is that a social dominance orientation is about the justness of one using force 
to get one’s way, whereas a system justification orientation is about opposing equality 
and justice.  It follows that system justification orientation-level (but not social 
dominance orientation-level), in combination with the status of the victim and whether or 
not she sought justice against her attacker, would predict how much a person would 
legitimize rape.      
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Whereas people’s system justification and social dominance orientations 
produced different models in predicting rape myth acceptance, system justification and 
social dominance orientations produced similar models in predicting victim blame and 
gender-specific system justification.  Controlling for people’s gender, people with a 
strong social dominance orientation blamed Kate more (or Jason less) than did people 
with a weak social dominance orientation.  Because people with a strong social 
dominance orientation are more accepting of force and domination, they may have been 
more sympathetic of Jason’s use of force and less sympathetic of Kate’s predicament 
(Pratto et al., 1994).  Furthermore, people blamed Kate more if she was lower status than 
the perpetrator and she decided to tell no one.  Again, participants may have read low-
status Kate’s decision to keep silent as an admission of guilt and “agreed” with her by 
blaming her more.  Although people with a weak social dominance orientation on 
average reported less victim blame than did those with a strong social dominance 
orientation, weak social dominance orientation-people reported more victim blame when 
the low-status victim was raped by the high-status perpetrator.  Because people with a 
weak social dominance orientation are less accepting of force and violence as a way to 
achieve and maintain status, it follows that they should be more likely to label Jason’s use 
of force as wrong and sympathize with the victim, regardless of her status.  However, this 
finding indicates that even people with a weak social dominance orientation are 
somewhat biased against a low-status victim (or biased toward a high-status perpetrator).   
In predicting gender-specific system justification, people with a strong social 
dominance orientation reported that economic conditions in the U.S. are fair for both 
women and men.  It follows that people who believe that there is a natural social 
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hierarchy and that those at the top can use whatever means to maintain that hierarchy 
would also think that the current system is fair.  Again, victim’s status and threat to the 
perpetrator were not significant predictors in this model.            
While this study provides interesting insight into the malleability of rape myth 
acceptance, there are caveats and limitations to this study.  First, the hierarchical 
regression models with interaction terms added a marginally-significant amount of 
variance.  Although the interactions were hypothesized by theory, these results need to be 
replicated.  Second, approximately 19% of the sample misremembered the scenario and 
were omitted from analyses.  It may be interesting to determine if people misremember 
aspects of a date-rape scenario to match their pre-existing stereotypes about rape.  Third, 
status was operationalized by the type of school the victim and perpetrator attended; 
people may have identified with the victim or the perpetrator based on where they 
matriculated.  Future studies could compare samples of college students currently 
attending a private university versus a state college, a technical school, and those who 
have not attended college.   
Future research should also examine the malleability of rape myths in cases of 
interracial rape and stranger rape.  Specifically, will people report lower rape myth 
acceptance if an African-American woman decides to keep silent about a White 
acquaintance raping her?  Will people report higher rape myth acceptance if a White 
woman is raped by an African-American stranger?  Future research could also determine 
how other types of violence, such as murder and interpersonal violence are legitimized.  
The advantage of using rape myths to understand the legitimization of violence is that, 
unlike other types of violence, rape is often perpetuated by one social group (i.e., men) 
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against another (i.e., women) and beliefs that legitimize rape have been identified and 
researched.  Nonetheless, understanding how other types of violence are justified in 
society is important for future study.  Also, it would be interesting to examine if other 
stereotypes, such as ambivalent sexism toward women and men, fluctuate depending on 
the victim’s status and the threat to the perpetrator. 
   In sum, previous research has focused on how rape myth acceptance is a 
stagnant trait that contributes to blaming the victim.  This is the first study to show that 
rape myth acceptance is malleable and contingent on the situation, as well as individual 
attributes.  Although it was predicted that people would clamor against the low-status 
victim when she threatened the high-status perpetrator, a more interesting social 
phenomenon was found.  Rape myth acceptance across conditions was fairly constant 
with one exception: people with a strong system justification orientation reported less 
rape myth acceptance when the low-status victim protected the high-status perpetrator.  
In contrast to Jackman’s (2001) assertion that dominant-group members vilify 
subordinate-group members who seek justice, this study suggests that rape myth 
acceptance is an ideology that vilifies victims regardless of status; however, people who 
support the status quo “remove” this ideology when a low-status victim knows her place.  
This is akin to rewarding desirable behavior through negative reinforcement.  Although 
the “reward” of lower rape myth acceptance would be viewed as politically correct and 
sensitive to victim’s rights, it is an underhanded and non-confrontational way to control 
social behavior and protect the status quo.  Worse, people themselves may not even 
realize that they are engaging in this social sleight-of-hand.  In order to dismantle rape 
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myths (and other ideologies), we can not be satisfied with merely labeling the traits of 
those who endorse them – we must uncover the mechanisms of rape myth acceptance.  
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FOOTNOTES 
1Because women’s ratings were more extreme, it was important to determine that 
their ratings were not driving the significant differences in social status between the three 
types of schools.  In other words, it was important to determine if men’s perceptions of 
social status also varied by type of school.  A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted 
for men separately.  The main effect for the type of item was significant (F(1.9, 560.1) = 
101.6, p < .001) indicating that men perceived different levels of social status based on 
the type of school Kate and Jason attended.    
 
 
2For each of the DVs, preliminary hierarchical regressions were run with gender, 
System Justification Orientation, Social Dominance Orientation, Friend, Police, Equal, 
and Higher entered in the first step.  All possible interactions 2-way, 3-way, 4-way, and 
5-way interactions were entered in succeeding steps.  For both victim blame and gender-
specific system justification, there were main effects of Social Dominance Orientation.  
For rape myth acceptance, however, the model with 5-way interactions was significant.  
To disentangle this model, separate regressions were run for System Justification 
Orientation (collapsing across level of Social Dominance Orientation) and for Social 
Dominance Orientation (collapsing across level of System Justification Orientation).  The 
results from these separate regressions are reported.     
   
 
3Similar results were obtained using the untransformed scores for System 
Justification Orientation and Social Dominance Orientation. 
 
 
4Differences between system justification orientation levels were tested.  For the 
condition in which the lower-status victim told no one about the higher-status perpetrator 
raping her, people with a strong system justification orientation had marginally lower 
rape myth acceptance than did people with a weak system justification orientation (Lower 
x No one:  B = -.47, t = 1.78, p = .08).   For the condition in which the lower-status victim 
reported the higher-status perpetrator to the police, there was no significant difference in 
rape myth acceptance between people with a strong and weak system justification 
orientation (Lower x Police: B = .22, t = 1.32, p = .19).  
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APPENDIX A 
Measure of Social Status 
 
The following questions ask about a person’s social status.  When answering these 
questions, think about how most people would rate each person’s social status.  Please 
use the scale below when answering. 
 
 
0--------1--------2---------3---------4---------5----------6---------7---------8---------9--------10 
 
No Social                    Some Social              A great deal 
Status        Status             of Social Status  
             
 
 
1.  Kate is a junior at a prestigious, private university 
 
2.  Kate is a junior at a state college 
 
3.  Kate dropped out of state college but now takes classes at a local technical college 
part-time 
 
4.  Jason is a junior at a prestigious, private university 
 
5.  Jason is a junior at a state college 
 
6.  Jason dropped out of state college but now takes classes at a local technical college 
part-time 
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APPENDIX B 
Social Dominance Orientation 
For the following items, please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with 
each statement: 
 
1----------2----------3----------4-----------5----------6----------7----------8----------9 
    Not at all           Somewhat         Very much 
agree     agree          agree 
  
 
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups 
of people.  
 
3. It’s OK if some groups of people have more of a chance in life than others. 
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups of people. 
5. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.  
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups of people are at the top and other groups 
are at the bottom.  
 
7. Inferior groups of people should stay in their place.  
8. Sometimes other groups of people must be kept in their place. 
9. It would be good if all groups of people could be equal.  
10. Group equality should be our ideal.  
11. All groups of people should be given an equal chance in life.  
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.  
13. Increased social equality would have negative consequences.  
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.   
15. We should strive to make people’s incomes as equal as possible. 
16. No one group of people should dominate in society.  
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APPENDIX C 
Perceptions of Victim and Perpetrator 
 
For the following items, use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each 
statement: 
 
 
1----------2----------3----------4-----------5----------6----------7----------8----------9 
 Not              Somewhat        Completely or 
at all                         Totally 
 
1.   How much do you think Kate should blame herself for what happened? 
2.   How much do you think Jason should blame himself for what happened? 
3.   How much control do you think Kate had over the situation?  
4.   How much control do you think Jason had over the situation? 
5.   How much do you agree Kate should not have gone to Jason’s apartment if she did 
not want to have sex with him? 
 
6.   Given the circumstances, how justified do you think Jason’s actions were? 
7.   How much do you agree that Kate should not have kissed Jason if she did not want to 
have sex with him? 
 
8. Whose fault do you think it is that things turned out the way they did? (1 = Jason; 5 = 
Kate & Jason equally; 9 = Kate) 
 
9.   How much sympathy do you feel for Kate? 
10. How much sympathy do you feel for Jason? 
11. Who do you feel more sympathy for? (1 = Jason; 5 = Kate & Jason equally; 9= Kate) 
12. How much do you agree with Kate’s decision about who she should tell regarding the 
incident with Jason? 
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APPENDIX D 
Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale 
 
For the following items, use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each 
statement: 
 
1-----------2-----------3----------4-----------5----------6----------7----------8----------9 
Not at all                Somewhat       Very much 
agree          agree               agree  
   
1.  If a woman is raped while she is drunk, she is at least somewhat responsible for letting 
things get out of control. 
 
2.  Although most women wouldn’t admit it, they generally find being physically forced 
into sex a real “turn-on.” 
 
3.  If a woman is willing to “make out” with a guy, then it’s no big deal if he goes a little 
further and has sex. 
 
4.  Many women secretly desire to be raped. 
5.  Most rapists are not caught by the police. 
6.  If a woman doesn’t physically fight back, you can’t really say that it was rape. 
7.  Men from nice middle-class homes almost never rape. 
8.  Rape accusations are often used as a way of getting back at men. 
9.  All women should have access to self-defense classes. 
10. It is usually only women who dress suggestively that are raped. 
11. If the rapist doesn’t have a weapon, you really can’t call it a rape. 
12. Rape is unlikely to happen in the woman’s own familiar neighborhood. 
13. Women tend to exaggerate how much rape affects them. 
14. A lot of women lead a man on and then they cry rape. 
15. It is preferable that a female police officer conduct the questioning when a woman 
reports a rape. 
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16. A woman who “teases” men deserves anything that might happen. 
17. When women are raped, it’s often because the way they said “no” was ambiguous. 
18. Men don’t usually intend to force sex on a woman, but sometimes they get too 
sexually carried away. 
 
19. A woman who dresses in skimpy clothes should not be surprised if a man tries to 
force her to have sex. 
 
20. Rape happens when a man’s sex drive gets out of control. 
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APPENDIX E 
Gender-Specific System Justification measure 
 
Instructions:  Please read the sentences below.  Use the scale to indicate to what degree 
you agree or disagree with each sentence. 
 
1-----------2-----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7----------8----------9 
    Not at all             Somewhat       Very much 
agree     agree               agree  
 
 
1. In general, relations between men and women are fair in the United States. 
2. In America, the division of labor in families generally operates as it should. 
3. Gender roles need to be radically restructured in the United States. 
4. For women, the United States is the best country in the world to live in. 
5. In the United States, most policies relating to gender and the sexual division of labor 
serve the greater good. 
 
6. Everyone (male or female) has a fair shot at wealth and happiness in the United 
States. 
 
7. Sexism in America is getting worse every year. 
8. American society is set up so that men and women usually get what they deserve 
(have earned). 
 
9. America is an open society in which both men and women can achieve higher status. 
10. Advancement in American society is possible for both men and women. 
11. Individual women have difficulty achieving higher status in the United States. 
12. Women are often unable to advance in American society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
APPENDIX F 
Scenario manipulation checks 
 
Think about the story you read earlier about Kate and Jason. Please answer the following 
questions about the story. 
 
Where did Kate go to school? (check one) 
High school 
Technical college 
State college 
Private university 
 
Where did Jason go to school? (check one) 
High school 
Technical college 
State college 
Private university 
 
Who did Kate decide to tell regarding the incident with Jason? (check one) 
 No one 
 Her friend 
 Her parents 
 A school counselor 
 The police 
 
